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cli/vendor/aws-lc-sys/aws-lc/crypto/cipher_extra/cipher_test.cc

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chore: checkpoint before Python removal
2026-03-26 22:33:59 +00:00
// Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project.
// Copyright (c) 2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/span.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
#include "../test/wycheproof_util.h"
#include "./internal.h"
static const EVP_CIPHER *GetCipher(const std::string &name) {
if (name == "DES-CBC") {
return EVP_des_cbc();
} else if (name == "DES-ECB") {
return EVP_des_ecb();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE") {
return EVP_des_ede();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE3") {
return EVP_des_ede3();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE-CBC") {
return EVP_des_ede_cbc();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE3-CBC") {
return EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
} else if (name == "RC4") {
return EVP_rc4();
} else if (name == "AES-128-ECB") {
return EVP_aes_128_ecb();
} else if (name == "AES-256-ECB") {
return EVP_aes_256_ecb();
} else if (name == "AES-128-CBC") {
return EVP_aes_128_cbc();
} else if (name == "AES-128-GCM") {
return EVP_aes_128_gcm();
} else if (name == "AES-128-OFB") {
return EVP_aes_128_ofb();
} else if (name == "AES-192-CBC") {
return EVP_aes_192_cbc();
} else if (name == "AES-192-CTR") {
return EVP_aes_192_ctr();
} else if (name == "AES-192-ECB") {
return EVP_aes_192_ecb();
} else if (name == "AES-192-GCM") {
return EVP_aes_192_gcm();
} else if (name == "AES-192-OFB") {
return EVP_aes_192_ofb();
} else if (name == "AES-256-CBC") {
return EVP_aes_256_cbc();
} else if (name == "AES-128-CTR") {
return EVP_aes_128_ctr();
} else if (name == "AES-256-CTR") {
return EVP_aes_256_ctr();
} else if (name == "AES-256-GCM") {
return EVP_aes_256_gcm();
} else if (name == "AES-256-OFB") {
return EVP_aes_256_ofb();
} else if (name == "AES-128-CCM") {
return EVP_aes_128_ccm();
} else if (name == "AES-192-CCM") {
return EVP_aes_192_ccm();
} else if (name == "AES-256-CCM") {
return EVP_aes_256_ccm();
}
return nullptr;
}
enum class Operation {
// kBoth tests both encryption and decryption.
kBoth,
// kEncrypt tests encryption. The result of encryption should always
// successfully decrypt, so this should only be used if the test file has a
// matching decrypt-only vector.
kEncrypt,
// kDecrypt tests decryption. This should only be used if the test file has a
// matching encrypt-only input, or if multiple ciphertexts are valid for
// a given plaintext and this is a non-canonical ciphertext.
kDecrypt,
// kInvalidDecrypt tests decryption and expects it to fail, e.g. due to
// invalid tag or padding.
kInvalidDecrypt,
};
static const char *OperationToString(Operation op) {
switch (op) {
case Operation::kBoth:
return "Both";
case Operation::kEncrypt:
return "Encrypt";
case Operation::kDecrypt:
return "Decrypt";
case Operation::kInvalidDecrypt:
return "InvalidDecrypt";
}
abort();
}
// MaybeCopyCipherContext, if |copy| is true, replaces |*ctx| with a, hopefully
// equivalent, copy of it.
static bool MaybeCopyCipherContext(bool copy,
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> *ctx) {
if (!copy) {
return true;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx2(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
if (!ctx2 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(ctx2.get(), ctx->get())) {
return false;
}
*ctx = std::move(ctx2);
return true;
}
static void TestCipherAPI(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, Operation op, bool padding,
bool copy, bool in_place, bool use_evp_cipher,
size_t chunk_size, bssl::Span<const uint8_t> key,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> iv,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> plaintext,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> aad,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> tag) {
bool encrypt = op == Operation::kEncrypt;
bool is_custom_cipher =
EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER;
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> in = encrypt ? plaintext : ciphertext;
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> expected = encrypt ? ciphertext : plaintext;
bool is_aead = EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
bool is_ccm = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE;
// Some |EVP_CIPHER|s take a variable-length key, and need to first be
// configured with the key length, which requires configuring the cipher.
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, /*engine=*/nullptr,
/*key=*/nullptr, /*iv=*/nullptr,
encrypt ? 1 : 0));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx.get(), key.size()));
if (!padding) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0));
}
// Configure the key.
ASSERT_TRUE(MaybeCopyCipherContext(copy, &ctx));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), /*cipher=*/nullptr,
/*engine=*/nullptr, key.data(), /*iv=*/nullptr,
/*enc=*/-1));
// Configure the IV to run the actual operation. Callers that wish to use a
// key for multiple, potentially concurrent, operations will likely copy at
// this point. The |EVP_CIPHER_CTX| API uses the same type to represent a
// pre-computed key schedule and a streaming operation.
ASSERT_TRUE(MaybeCopyCipherContext(copy, &ctx));
if (is_aead) {
ASSERT_LE(iv.size(), size_t{INT_MAX});
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
static_cast<int>(iv.size()), nullptr));
ASSERT_EQ(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get()), iv.size());
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(iv.size(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get()));
}
// CCM needs tag length (M) set via EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG during encryption.
if ((is_aead && !encrypt) || is_ccm) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
tag.size(), encrypt ? nullptr
: const_cast<uint8_t *>(tag.data())));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), /*cipher=*/nullptr,
/*engine=*/nullptr,
/*key=*/nullptr, iv.data(), /*enc=*/-1));
// CCM requires the full length of the plaintext to be known ahead of time.
if (is_ccm) {
int len;
if (use_evp_cipher) {
len = EVP_Cipher(ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, in.size());
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, nullptr,
in.size()));
}
ASSERT_EQ(len, (int) in.size());
}
// Note: the deprecated |EVP_CIPHER|-based AEAD API is sensitive to whether
// parameters are NULL, so it is important to skip the |in| and |aad|
// |EVP_CipherUpdate| calls when empty.
while (!aad.empty()) {
size_t todo =
chunk_size == 0 ? aad.size() : std::min(aad.size(), chunk_size);
if (use_evp_cipher) {
// AEADs always use the "custom cipher" return value convention. Passing a
// null output pointer triggers the AAD logic.
ASSERT_TRUE(is_custom_cipher);
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<int>(todo),
EVP_Cipher(ctx.get(), nullptr, aad.data(), todo));
} else {
int len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, aad.data(), todo));
// Although it doesn't output anything, |EVP_CipherUpdate| should claim to
// output the input length.
EXPECT_EQ(len, static_cast<int>(todo));
}
aad = aad.subspan(todo);
}
// Set up the output buffer.
size_t max_out = in.size();
size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx.get());
if (block_size > 1 &&
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx.get()) & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) == 0 &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx.get())) {
max_out += block_size - (max_out % block_size);
}
std::vector<uint8_t> result;
max_out ? result.resize(max_out) : result.reserve(1);
if (in_place) {
std::copy(in.begin(), in.end(), result.begin());
in = bssl::MakeConstSpan(result).first(in.size());
}
// An idiosyncrasy of OpenSSL's AES-CCM implementation is that it checks the
// tag during the one and only |EVP_CipherUpdate| so we have to handle that.
bool is_invalid_ccm = is_ccm && op == Operation::kInvalidDecrypt;
size_t total = 0;
int len;
do {
size_t todo = chunk_size == 0 ? in.size() : std::min(in.size(), chunk_size);
EXPECT_LE(todo, static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX));
ASSERT_TRUE(MaybeCopyCipherContext(copy, &ctx));
if (use_evp_cipher) {
// |EVP_Cipher| sometimes returns the number of bytes written, or -1 on
// error, and sometimes 1 or 0, implicitly writing |in_len| bytes.
if (is_custom_cipher) {
len = EVP_Cipher(ctx.get(), result.data() + total, in.data(), todo);
if (is_invalid_ccm) {
ASSERT_EQ(len, -1);
break;
}
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(
1, EVP_Cipher(ctx.get(), result.data() + total, in.data(), todo));
len = static_cast<int>(todo);
}
} else {
int expected_ret = is_invalid_ccm ? 0 : 1;
ASSERT_EQ(expected_ret, EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), result.data() + total,
&len, in.data(),
static_cast<int>(todo)));
}
ASSERT_GE(len, 0);
total += static_cast<size_t>(len);
in = in.subspan(todo);
} while (!in.empty());
len = -1;
if (op == Operation::kInvalidDecrypt) {
if (use_evp_cipher) {
// Only the "custom cipher" return value convention can report failures.
// Passing all nulls should act like |EVP_CipherFinal_ex|.
ASSERT_TRUE(is_custom_cipher);
int expected_ret = is_ccm ? 0 : -1;
EXPECT_EQ(expected_ret, EVP_Cipher(ctx.get(), result.data() + total,
nullptr, 0));
} else {
// Invalid padding and invalid tags all appear as a failed
// |EVP_CipherFinal_ex|. In CCM, this happens in |EVP_CipherUpdate|.
int expected_ret = is_ccm ? 1 : 0;
EXPECT_EQ(expected_ret, EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
result.data() + total, &len));
}
} else {
if (use_evp_cipher) {
if (is_custom_cipher) {
// Only the "custom cipher" convention has an |EVP_CipherFinal_ex|
// equivalent.
len = EVP_Cipher(ctx.get(), result.data() + total, nullptr, 0);
} else {
len = 0;
}
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx.get(), result.data() + total, &len));
}
ASSERT_GE(len, 0);
total += static_cast<size_t>(len);
result.resize(total);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(result));
if (encrypt && is_aead) {
uint8_t rtag[16];
ASSERT_LE(tag.size(), sizeof(rtag));
ASSERT_TRUE(MaybeCopyCipherContext(copy, &ctx));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
tag.size(), rtag));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(rtag, tag.size()));
}
}
}
static void TestLowLevelAPI(
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, Operation op, bool in_place, size_t chunk_size,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> key, bssl::Span<const uint8_t> iv,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> plaintext, bssl::Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext) {
bool encrypt = op == Operation::kEncrypt;
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> in = encrypt ? plaintext : ciphertext;
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> expected = encrypt ? ciphertext : plaintext;
int nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
bool is_ctr = nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
nid == NID_aes_256_ctr;
bool is_cbc = nid == NID_aes_128_cbc || nid == NID_aes_192_cbc ||
nid == NID_aes_256_cbc;
bool is_ofb = nid == NID_aes_128_ofb128 || nid == NID_aes_192_ofb128 ||
nid == NID_aes_256_ofb128;
if (!is_ctr && !is_cbc && !is_ofb) {
return;
}
// Invalid ciphertexts are not possible in any of the ciphers where this API
// applies.
ASSERT_NE(op, Operation::kInvalidDecrypt);
AES_KEY aes;
if (encrypt || !is_cbc) {
ASSERT_EQ(0, AES_set_encrypt_key(key.data(), key.size() * 8, &aes));
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(0, AES_set_decrypt_key(key.data(), key.size() * 8, &aes));
}
std::vector<uint8_t> result;
if (in_place) {
result.assign(in.begin(), in.end());
} else {
result.resize(expected.size());
}
bssl::Span<uint8_t> out = bssl::MakeSpan(result);
// Input and output sizes for all the low-level APIs should match.
ASSERT_EQ(in.size(), out.size());
// The low-level APIs all use block-size IVs.
ASSERT_EQ(iv.size(), size_t{AES_BLOCK_SIZE});
uint8_t ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
OPENSSL_memcpy(ivec, iv.data(), iv.size());
if (is_ctr) {
unsigned num = 0;
uint8_t ecount_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (chunk_size == 0) {
AES_ctr128_encrypt(in.data(), out.data(), in.size(), &aes, ivec,
ecount_buf, &num);
} else {
do {
size_t todo = std::min(in.size(), chunk_size);
AES_ctr128_encrypt(in.data(), out.data(), todo, &aes, ivec, ecount_buf,
&num);
in = in.subspan(todo);
out = out.subspan(todo);
} while (!in.empty());
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(result));
} else if (is_cbc && chunk_size % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0) {
// Note |AES_cbc_encrypt| requires block-aligned chunks.
if (chunk_size == 0) {
AES_cbc_encrypt(in.data(), out.data(), in.size(), &aes, ivec, encrypt);
} else {
do {
size_t todo = std::min(in.size(), chunk_size);
AES_cbc_encrypt(in.data(), out.data(), todo, &aes, ivec, encrypt);
in = in.subspan(todo);
out = out.subspan(todo);
} while (!in.empty());
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(result));
} else if (is_ofb) {
int num = 0;
if (chunk_size == 0) {
AES_ofb128_encrypt(in.data(), out.data(), in.size(), &aes, ivec, &num);
} else {
do {
size_t todo = std::min(in.size(), chunk_size);
AES_ofb128_encrypt(in.data(), out.data(), todo, &aes, ivec, &num);
in = in.subspan(todo);
out = out.subspan(todo);
} while (!in.empty());
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(result));
}
}
static void TestCipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, Operation input_op,
bool padding, bssl::Span<const uint8_t> key,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> iv,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> plaintext,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> ciphertext,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> aad,
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> tag) {
size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher);
bool is_ccm = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE;
std::vector<Operation> ops;
if (input_op == Operation::kBoth) {
ops = {Operation::kEncrypt, Operation::kDecrypt};
} else {
ops = {input_op};
}
for (Operation op : ops) {
SCOPED_TRACE(OperationToString(op));
// Zero indicates a single-shot API.
static const size_t kChunkSizes[] = {0, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16,
17, 31, 32, 33, 63, 64, 65, 512};
for (size_t chunk_size : kChunkSizes) {
SCOPED_TRACE(chunk_size);
if (chunk_size > plaintext.size() && chunk_size > ciphertext.size() &&
chunk_size > aad.size()) {
continue;
}
// CCM only supports single-shot operations.
if (is_ccm && chunk_size != 0) {
continue;
}
for (bool in_place : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(in_place);
for (bool copy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(copy);
TestCipherAPI(cipher, op, padding, copy, in_place,
/*use_evp_cipher=*/false, chunk_size, key, iv,
plaintext, ciphertext, aad, tag);
if (!padding && chunk_size % block_size == 0) {
TestCipherAPI(cipher, op, padding, copy, in_place,
/*use_evp_cipher=*/true, chunk_size, key, iv,
plaintext, ciphertext, aad, tag);
}
}
if (!padding) {
TestLowLevelAPI(cipher, op, in_place, chunk_size, key, iv, plaintext,
ciphertext);
}
}
}
}
}
static void CipherFileTest(FileTest *t) {
std::string cipher_str;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&cipher_str, "Cipher"));
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = GetCipher(cipher_str);
ASSERT_TRUE(cipher);
std::vector<uint8_t> key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext, aad, tag;
// Force an allocation of the underlying data-store so that v.data() is
// non-NULL even for empty test vectors.
plaintext.reserve(1);
ciphertext.reserve(1);
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "Key"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&plaintext, "Plaintext"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ciphertext, "Ciphertext"));
if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) > 0) {
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&iv, "IV"));
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&aad, "AAD"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "Tag"));
}
Operation op = Operation::kBoth;
if (t->HasAttribute("Operation")) {
const std::string &str = t->GetAttributeOrDie("Operation");
if (str == "Encrypt" || str == "ENCRYPT") {
op = Operation::kEncrypt;
} else if (str == "Decrypt" || str == "DECRYPT") {
op = Operation::kDecrypt;
} else if (str == "InvalidDecrypt") {
op = Operation::kInvalidDecrypt;
} else {
FAIL() << "Unknown operation: " << str;
}
}
TestCipher(cipher, op, /*padding=*/false, key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext, aad,
tag);
}
TEST(CipherTest, TestVectors) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/cipher_tests.txt", CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, AES_CCM) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/aes_ccm_test.txt", CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_AES_128_CBC) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_128_cbc.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_AES_128_CTR) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_128_ctr.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_AES_192_CBC) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_192_cbc.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_AES_192_CTR) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_192_ctr.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_AES_256_CBC) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_256_cbc.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_AES_256_CTR) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/aes_256_ctr.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_TDES_CBC) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/tdes_cbc.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
TEST(CipherTest, CAVP_TDES_ECB) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/cipher_extra/test/nist_cavp/tdes_ecb.txt",
CipherFileTest);
}
struct AeadCipherParams {
const char name[40];
const EVP_CIPHER *(*func)(void);
const char *test_vectors;
};
static const struct AeadCipherParams AeadCiphers[] = {
{"ChaCha20Poly1305", EVP_chacha20_poly1305, "chacha20_poly1305_tests.txt"},
{"AES_128_CCM_BLUETOOTH", EVP_aes_128_ccm, "aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_tests.txt"},
{"AES_128_CCM_BLUETOOTH_8", EVP_aes_128_ccm,
"aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8_tests.txt"},
{"AES_128_CCM_Matter", EVP_aes_128_ccm, "aes_128_ccm_matter_tests.txt"},
};
class AeadCipherTest : public testing::TestWithParam<AeadCipherParams> {
public:
const EVP_CIPHER *getTestCipher() {
return GetParam().func();
}
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All, AeadCipherTest, testing::ValuesIn(AeadCiphers),
[](const testing::TestParamInfo<AeadCipherParams> &params)
-> std::string { return params.param.name; });
TEST_P(AeadCipherTest, TestVector) {
std::string test_vectors = "crypto/cipher_extra/test/";
test_vectors += GetParam().test_vectors;
FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = getTestCipher();
ASSERT_TRUE(cipher);
std::vector<uint8_t> key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext, aad, tag;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "KEY"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&plaintext, "IN"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ciphertext, "CT"));
if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) > 0) {
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&iv, "NONCE"));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER);
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&aad, "AD"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "TAG"));
Operation op = Operation::kBoth;
TestCipher(cipher, op, /*padding=*/false, key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext,
aad, tag);
});
}
// Given a size_t, return true if it's valid. These hardcoded validators are
// necessary because the Wychefproof test vectors are not consistent about
// setting the right validity flags.
typedef bool(*validate_f)(size_t);
static void WycheproofFileTest(FileTest *t, std::vector<uint8_t> key,
std::vector<uint8_t> iv, std::vector<uint8_t> msg, std::vector<uint8_t> ct,
std::vector<uint8_t> aad, std::vector<uint8_t> tag, WycheproofResult result,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, validate_f iv_validate, validate_f tag_validate) {
std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)> uctx(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = uctx.get();
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
bool is_ccm = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE;
bool valid_iv = iv_validate(iv.size());
bool valid_tag = tag_validate(tag.size());
// Initialize without the key/iv
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL));
// Set the IV size
int res;
res = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, iv.size(), NULL);
if (!valid_iv && !result.IsValid()) {
// Check that we correctly reject the IV and skip.
// Otherwise, the cipher will simply just use IV=0.
ASSERT_EQ(res, 0);
t->SkipCurrent();
return;
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(res, 1);
}
// Set the tag size for CCM
if (is_ccm) {
res = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag.size(),
nullptr);
if (!valid_tag && !result.IsValid()) {
ASSERT_FALSE(res);
t->SkipCurrent();
return;
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(res);
}
}
// Initialize with the key/iv
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, nullptr, nullptr, key.data(), iv.data()));
// Set the message length for CCM
int out_len = 0;
if (is_ccm) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, nullptr, &out_len, nullptr, msg.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, (int) msg.size());
}
// Insert AAD
uint8_t junk_buf[1];
uint8_t *in = aad.empty() ? junk_buf : aad.data();
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, /*out*/ nullptr, &out_len, in, aad.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, (int) aad.size());
// Insert plaintext
std::vector<uint8_t> computed_ct(ct.size());
in = msg.empty() ? junk_buf : msg.data();
uint8_t *out = computed_ct.empty() ? junk_buf : computed_ct.data();
out_len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &out_len, in, msg.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, (int) msg.size());
// Finish the cipher
out_len = 0;
out = computed_ct.empty() ?
junk_buf : computed_ct.data() + computed_ct.size();
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, out, &out_len));
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, 0);
// Get the tag
std::vector<uint8_t> computed_tag(tag.size());
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, tag.size(),
computed_tag.data()));
// Initialize the decrypt context
std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)> udctx(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dctx = udctx.get();
ASSERT_TRUE(dctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(dctx, cipher, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
// Set the CTRL parameters
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, iv.size(),
nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag.size(),
tag.data()));
// Initialize with the key/iv
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(dctx, NULL, NULL, key.data(), iv.data()));
// Set the message length for CCM
if (is_ccm) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherUpdate(dctx, nullptr, &out_len, nullptr, msg.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, (int) msg.size());
}
// Insert AAD
out_len = 0;
in = aad.empty() ? junk_buf : aad.data();
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptUpdate(dctx, NULL, &out_len, in, aad.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, (int) aad.size());
// Insert ciphertext
std::vector<uint8_t> computed_pt(msg.size());
in = ct.empty() ? junk_buf : ct.data();
out_len = 0;
bool is_invalid_ccm = is_ccm && !result.IsValid();
int expected_res = is_invalid_ccm ? 0 : 1;
res = EVP_DecryptUpdate(dctx, computed_pt.data(), &out_len, in, ct.size());
ASSERT_EQ(expected_res, res);
if (!is_invalid_ccm) {
ASSERT_EQ((int) msg.size(), out_len);
}
// Finish decryption
out_len = 0;
out = computed_pt.empty() ?
junk_buf : computed_pt.data() + computed_pt.size();
expected_res = is_invalid_ccm ? 1 : result.IsValid() ? 1 : 0;
res = EVP_DecryptFinal(dctx, out, &out_len);
// Tag validation, a valid result should end with a valid tag
ASSERT_EQ(expected_res, res);
ASSERT_EQ(out_len, 0);
// Valid results should match the KATs
if (result.IsValid()) {
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(tag.data(), tag.size()),
Bytes(computed_tag.data(), computed_tag.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(msg.data(), msg.size()),
Bytes(computed_pt.data(), computed_pt.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(ct.data(), ct.size()),
Bytes(computed_ct.data(), computed_ct.size()));
}
}
static bool ChaCha20Poly1305IvValidate(size_t iv_size) {
return iv_size == 12;
}
static bool ChaCha20Poly1305TagValidate(size_t tag_size) {
return tag_size <= 16;
}
TEST(CipherTest, WycheproofChaCha20Poly1305) {
std::string test_vectors =
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/chacha20_poly1305_test.txt";
FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreInstruction("type");
t->IgnoreInstruction("tagSize");
t->IgnoreInstruction("keySize");
t->IgnoreInstruction("ivSize");
std::vector<uint8_t> key, iv, msg, ct, aad, tag;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "key"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&iv, "iv"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "ct"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&aad, "aad"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "tag"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_chacha20_poly1305();
ASSERT_TRUE(cipher);
WycheproofFileTest(t, key, iv, msg, ct, aad, tag, result, cipher,
&ChaCha20Poly1305IvValidate,
&ChaCha20Poly1305TagValidate);
});
}
static bool AesCcmIvValidate(size_t iv_size) {
size_t L = 15 - iv_size;
if (L < 2 || L > 8) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool AesCcmTagValidate(size_t tag_size) {
if ((tag_size & 1) || tag_size < 4 || tag_size > 16) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
TEST(CipherTest, WycheproofAesCcm) {
std::string test_vectors =
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_ccm_test.txt";
FileTestGTest(test_vectors.c_str(), [&](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreInstruction("type");
t->IgnoreInstruction("tagSize");
t->IgnoreInstruction("ivSize");
std::vector<uint8_t> key, iv, msg, ct, aad, tag;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "key"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&iv, "iv"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "ct"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&aad, "aad"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "tag"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
std::string key_size;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&key_size, "keySize"));
uint32_t key_bits = std::stoi(key_size);
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
switch (key_bits) {
case 128:
cipher = EVP_aes_128_ccm();
break;
case 192:
cipher = EVP_aes_192_ccm();
break;
case 256:
cipher = EVP_aes_256_ccm();
break;
default:
FAIL();
}
ASSERT_TRUE(cipher);
WycheproofFileTest(t, key, iv, msg, ct, aad, tag, result, cipher,
&AesCcmIvValidate, &AesCcmTagValidate);
});
}
TEST(CipherTest, WycheproofAESCBC) {
FileTestGTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_cbc_pkcs5_test.txt",
[](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreInstruction("type");
t->IgnoreInstruction("ivSize");
std::string key_size;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&key_size, "keySize"));
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
switch (atoi(key_size.c_str())) {
case 128:
cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case 192:
cipher = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
break;
case 256:
cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
default:
FAIL() << "Unsupported key size: " << key_size;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> key, iv, msg, ct;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "key"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&iv, "iv"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "ct"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
TestCipher(cipher,
result.IsValid() ? Operation::kBoth
: Operation::kInvalidDecrypt,
/*padding=*/true, key, iv, msg, ct, /*aad=*/{},
/*tag=*/{});
});
}
TEST(CipherTest, SHA1WithSecretSuffix) {
uint8_t buf[SHA_CBLOCK * 4];
RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf));
// Hashing should run in time independent of the bytes.
CONSTTIME_SECRET(buf, sizeof(buf));
// Exhaustively testing interesting cases in this function is cubic in the
// block size, so we test in 3-byte increments.
constexpr size_t kSkip = 3;
// This value should be less than 8 to test the edge case when the 8-byte
// length wraps to the next block.
static_assert(kSkip < 8, "kSkip is too large");
// |EVP_final_with_secret_suffix_sha1| is sensitive to the public length of
// the partial block previously hashed. In TLS, this is the HMAC prefix, the
// header, and the public minimum padding length.
for (size_t prefix = 0; prefix < SHA_CBLOCK; prefix += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(prefix);
// The first block is treated differently, so we run with up to three
// blocks of length variability.
for (size_t max_len = 0; max_len < 3 * SHA_CBLOCK; max_len += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(max_len);
for (size_t len = 0; len <= max_len; len += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(len);
uint8_t expected[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
SHA1(buf, prefix + len, expected);
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(expected, sizeof(expected));
// Make a copy of the secret length to avoid interfering with the loop.
size_t secret_len = len;
CONSTTIME_SECRET(&secret_len, sizeof(secret_len));
SHA_CTX ctx;
SHA1_Init(&ctx);
SHA1_Update(&ctx, buf, prefix);
uint8_t computed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_final_with_secret_suffix_sha1(
&ctx, computed, buf + prefix, secret_len, max_len));
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(computed, sizeof(computed));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(computed));
}
}
}
}
TEST(CipherTest, SHA256WithSecretSuffix) {
uint8_t buf[SHA256_CBLOCK * 4];
RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf));
// Hashing should run in time independent of the bytes.
CONSTTIME_SECRET(buf, sizeof(buf));
// Exhaustively testing interesting cases in this function is cubic in the
// block size, so we test in 3-byte increments.
constexpr size_t kSkip = 3;
// This value should be less than 8 to test the edge case when the 8-byte
// length wraps to the next block.
static_assert(kSkip < 8, "kSkip is too large");
// |EVP_final_with_secret_suffix_sha256| is sensitive to the public length of
// the partial block previously hashed. In TLS, this is the HMAC prefix, the
// header, and the public minimum padding length.
for (size_t prefix = 0; prefix < SHA256_CBLOCK; prefix += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(prefix);
// The first block is treated differently, so we run with up to three
// blocks of length variability.
for (size_t max_len = 0; max_len < 3 * SHA256_CBLOCK; max_len += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(max_len);
for (size_t len = 0; len <= max_len; len += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(len);
uint8_t expected[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
SHA256(buf, prefix + len, expected);
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(expected, sizeof(expected));
// Make a copy of the secret length to avoid interfering with the loop.
size_t secret_len = len;
CONSTTIME_SECRET(&secret_len, sizeof(secret_len));
SHA256_CTX ctx;
SHA256_Init(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, buf, prefix);
uint8_t computed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_final_with_secret_suffix_sha256(
&ctx, computed, buf + prefix, secret_len, max_len));
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(computed, sizeof(computed));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(computed));
}
}
}
}
TEST(CipherTest, SHA384WithSecretSuffix) {
uint8_t buf[SHA384_CBLOCK * 4];
RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf));
// Hashing should run in time independent of the bytes.
CONSTTIME_SECRET(buf, sizeof(buf));
// Exhaustively testing interesting cases in this function is cubic in the
// block size, so we test in 7-byte increments.
constexpr size_t kSkip = 7;
// This value should be less than 16 to test the edge case when the 16-byte
// length wraps to the next block.
static_assert(kSkip < 16, "kSkip is too large");
// |EVP_final_with_secret_suffix_sha384| is sensitive to the public length of
// the partial block previously hashed. In TLS, this is the HMAC prefix, the
// header, and the public minimum padding length.
for (size_t prefix = 0; prefix < SHA384_CBLOCK; prefix += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(prefix);
// The first block is treated differently, so we run with up to three
// blocks of length variability.
for (size_t max_len = 0; max_len < 3 * SHA384_CBLOCK; max_len += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(max_len);
for (size_t len = 0; len <= max_len; len += kSkip) {
SCOPED_TRACE(len);
uint8_t expected[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH];
SHA384(buf, prefix + len, expected);
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(expected, sizeof(expected));
// Make a copy of the secret length to avoid interfering with the loop.
size_t secret_len = len;
CONSTTIME_SECRET(&secret_len, sizeof(secret_len));
SHA512_CTX ctx;
SHA384_Init(&ctx);
SHA384_Update(&ctx, buf, prefix);
uint8_t computed[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_final_with_secret_suffix_sha384(
&ctx, computed, buf + prefix, secret_len, max_len));
CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(computed, sizeof(computed));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected), Bytes(computed));
}
}
}
}
TEST(CipherTest, GetCipher) {
const auto test_get_cipher = [](int nid, const char *name) {
EXPECT_EQ(nid, EVP_CIPHER_nid(EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid)));
EXPECT_EQ(nid, EVP_CIPHER_nid(EVP_get_cipherbyname(name)));
};
// canonical names
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_cbc, "aes-128-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_cfb128, "aes-128-cfb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_ctr, "aes-128-ctr");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_ecb, "aes-128-ecb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_gcm, "aes-128-gcm");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_ofb128, "aes-128-ofb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_cbc, "aes-192-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_cfb128, "aes-192-cfb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_ctr, "aes-192-ctr");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_ecb, "aes-192-ecb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_gcm, "aes-192-gcm");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_ofb128, "aes-192-ofb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_cbc, "aes-256-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_cfb128, "aes-256-cfb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_ctr, "aes-256-ctr");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_ecb, "aes-256-ecb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_gcm, "aes-256-gcm");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_ofb128, "aes-256-ofb");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_xts, "aes-256-xts");
test_get_cipher(NID_chacha20_poly1305, "chacha20-poly1305");
test_get_cipher(NID_des_cbc, "des-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_des_ecb, "des-ecb");
test_get_cipher(NID_des_ede_cbc, "des-ede-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_des_ede_ecb, "des-ede");
test_get_cipher(NID_des_ede3_cbc, "des-ede3-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_rc2_cbc, "rc2-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_rc4, "rc4");
test_get_cipher(NID_bf_cbc, "bf-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_bf_cfb64, "bf-cfb");
test_get_cipher(NID_bf_ecb, "bf-ecb");
// aliases
test_get_cipher(NID_des_ede3_cbc, "des-ede3-cbc");
test_get_cipher(NID_des_cbc, "DES");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_cbc, "aes256");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_cbc, "aes128");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_128_gcm, "id-aes128-gcm");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_192_gcm, "id-aes192-gcm");
test_get_cipher(NID_aes_256_gcm, "id-aes256-gcm");
// error case
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_get_cipherbyname(nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_get_cipherbyname("vigenère"));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_get_cipherbynid(-1));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_block_size(nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(nullptr));
}
// Test the AES-GCM EVP_CIPHER's internal IV management APIs. OpenSSH uses these
// APIs.
TEST(CipherTest, GCMIncrementingIV) {
const EVP_CIPHER *kCipher = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
static const uint8_t kKey[16] = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15};
static const uint8_t kInput[] = {'h', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'o'};
auto expect_iv = [&](EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, bssl::Span<const uint8_t> iv,
bool enc) {
// Make a reference ciphertext.
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ref;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ref.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ref.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
static_cast<int>(iv.size()), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ref.get(), /*cipher=*/nullptr,
/*impl=*/nullptr, /*key=*/nullptr,
iv.data()));
uint8_t ciphertext[sizeof(kInput)];
int ciphertext_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ref.get(), ciphertext, &ciphertext_len,
kInput, sizeof(kInput)));
int extra_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ref.get(), nullptr, &extra_len));
ASSERT_EQ(extra_len, 0);
uint8_t tag[16];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ref.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
sizeof(tag), tag));
if (enc) {
uint8_t actual[sizeof(kInput)];
int actual_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, actual, &actual_len, kInput, sizeof(kInput)));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, nullptr, &extra_len));
ASSERT_EQ(extra_len, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(actual, actual_len), Bytes(ciphertext, ciphertext_len));
uint8_t actual_tag[16];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
sizeof(actual_tag), actual_tag));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(actual_tag), Bytes(tag));
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(tag),
const_cast<uint8_t *>(tag)));
uint8_t actual[sizeof(kInput)];
int actual_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, actual, &actual_len, ciphertext,
sizeof(ciphertext)));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, nullptr, &extra_len));
ASSERT_EQ(extra_len, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(actual, actual_len), Bytes(kInput));
}
};
{
// Passing in a fixed IV length of -1 sets the whole IV, but then configures
// |EVP_CIPHER_CTX| to increment the bottom 8 bytes of the IV.
static const uint8_t kIV1[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12};
static const uint8_t kIV2[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13};
static const uint8_t kIV3[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14};
static const uint8_t kIV4[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, -1,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV1)));
// EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN both configures and returns the IV.
uint8_t iv[12];
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV1));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV1, /*enc=*/true));
// Continuing to run EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN should increment the IV.
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV2));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV2, /*enc=*/true));
// Passing in a shorter length outputs the suffix portion.
uint8_t suffix[8];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
sizeof(suffix), suffix));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(suffix),
Bytes(bssl::MakeConstSpan(kIV3).last(sizeof(suffix))));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV3, /*enc=*/true));
// A length of -1 returns the whole IV.
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, -1, iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV4));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV4, /*enc=*/true));
}
{
// Similar to the above, but for decrypting.
static const uint8_t kIV1[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12};
static const uint8_t kIV2[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, -1,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV1)));
uint8_t iv[12];
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV1));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV1, /*enc=*/false));
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV2));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV2, /*enc=*/false));
}
{
// Test that only the bottom 8 bytes are used as a counter.
static const uint8_t kIV1[12] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
static const uint8_t kIV2[12] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
static const uint8_t kIV3[12] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, -1,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV1)));
uint8_t iv[12];
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV1));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV1, /*enc=*/true));
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV2));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV2, /*enc=*/true));
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV3));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV3, /*enc=*/true));
}
{
// Test with a longer IV length.
static const uint8_t kIV1[16] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
static const uint8_t kIV2[16] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
static const uint8_t kIV3[16] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
sizeof(kIV1), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, -1,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV1)));
uint8_t iv[16];
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV1));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV1, /*enc=*/true));
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV2));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV2, /*enc=*/true));
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, sizeof(iv), iv));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(iv), Bytes(kIV3));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV3, /*enc=*/true));
}
{
// When decrypting, callers are expected to configure the fixed half and
// invocation half separately. The two will get stitched together into the
// final IV.
const uint8_t kIV[12] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 4,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, 8,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV + 4)));
// EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV is sufficient to configure the IV. There is no
// need to call EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN.
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV, /*enc=*/false));
}
{
// Stitching together a decryption IV that exceeds the standard IV length.
const uint8_t kIV[16] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
sizeof(kIV), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 4,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, 12,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV + 4)));
// EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV is sufficient to configure the IV. There is no
// need to call EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN.
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), kIV, /*enc=*/false));
}
{
// Fixed IVs must be at least 4 bytes and admit at least an 8 byte counter.
const uint8_t kIV[16] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
// This means the default IV length only allows a 4/8 split.
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 0,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 3,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 4,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 5,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 16,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
// A longer IV allows a wider range.
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 16, nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 0,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 3,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 4,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 6,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 8,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 9,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED, 16,
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kIV)));
}
{
// When encrypting, setting a fixed IV randomizes the counter portion.
const uint8_t kFixedIV[4] = {1, 2, 3, 4};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED,
sizeof(kFixedIV),
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kFixedIV)));
uint8_t counter[8];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
sizeof(counter), counter));
uint8_t iv[12];
memcpy(iv, kFixedIV, sizeof(kFixedIV));
memcpy(iv + sizeof(kFixedIV), counter, sizeof(counter));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), iv, /*enc=*/true));
// The counter continues to act as a counter.
uint8_t counter2[8];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
sizeof(counter2), counter2));
EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTO_load_u64_be(counter2), CRYPTO_load_u64_be(counter) + 1);
memcpy(iv + sizeof(kFixedIV), counter2, sizeof(counter2));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), iv, /*enc=*/true));
}
{
// Same as above, but with a larger IV.
const uint8_t kFixedIV[8] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};
bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), kCipher, /*impl=*/nullptr, kKey,
/*iv=*/nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
sizeof(kFixedIV) + 8, nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED,
sizeof(kFixedIV),
const_cast<uint8_t *>(kFixedIV)));
uint8_t counter[8];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
sizeof(counter), counter));
uint8_t iv[16];
memcpy(iv, kFixedIV, sizeof(kFixedIV));
memcpy(iv + sizeof(kFixedIV), counter, sizeof(counter));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), iv, /*enc=*/true));
// The counter continues to act as a counter.
uint8_t counter2[8];
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
sizeof(counter2), counter2));
EXPECT_EQ(CRYPTO_load_u64_be(counter2), CRYPTO_load_u64_be(counter) + 1);
memcpy(iv + sizeof(kFixedIV), counter2, sizeof(counter2));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(expect_iv(ctx.get(), iv, /*enc=*/true));
}
}
#define CHECK_ERROR(function, err) \
ERR_clear_error(); \
EXPECT_FALSE(function); \
EXPECT_EQ(err, ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()));
TEST(CipherTest, Empty_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_V1187459157) {
int in_len = 10;
std::vector<uint8_t> in_vec(in_len);
int out_len = in_len + 256;
std::vector<uint8_t> out_vec(out_len);
CHECK_ERROR(EVP_EncryptUpdate(nullptr, out_vec.data(), &out_len, in_vec.data(), in_len), ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
CHECK_ERROR(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), out_vec.data(), &out_len, in_vec.data(), in_len), ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
CHECK_ERROR(EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx.get(), out_vec.data(), &out_len), ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
CHECK_ERROR(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), out_vec.data(), &out_len, in_vec.data(), in_len), ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
CHECK_ERROR(EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx.get(), out_vec.data(), &out_len), ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
}
struct CipherInfo {
const char *name;
const EVP_CIPHER *(*func)(void);
};
static const CipherInfo kAllCiphers[] = {
{"AES-128-ECB", EVP_aes_128_ecb},
{"AES-128-CBC", EVP_aes_128_cbc},
{"AES-128-CTR", EVP_aes_128_ctr},
{"AES-128-OFB", EVP_aes_128_ofb},
{"AES-128-GCM", EVP_aes_128_gcm},
{"AES-128-CCM", EVP_aes_128_ccm},
{"AES-192-ECB", EVP_aes_192_ecb},
{"AES-192-CBC", EVP_aes_192_cbc},
{"AES-192-CTR", EVP_aes_192_ctr},
{"AES-192-OFB", EVP_aes_192_ofb},
{"AES-192-GCM", EVP_aes_192_gcm},
{"AES-192-CCM", EVP_aes_192_ccm},
{"AES-256-ECB", EVP_aes_256_ecb},
{"AES-256-CBC", EVP_aes_256_cbc},
{"AES-256-CTR", EVP_aes_256_ctr},
{"AES-256-OFB", EVP_aes_256_ofb},
{"AES-256-GCM", EVP_aes_256_gcm},
{"AES-256-CCM", EVP_aes_256_ccm},
{"AES-256-XTS", EVP_aes_256_xts},
{"DES-CBC", EVP_des_cbc},
{"DES-ECB", EVP_des_ecb},
{"DES-EDE", EVP_des_ede},
{"DES-EDE3", EVP_des_ede3},
{"DES-EDE-CBC", EVP_des_ede_cbc},
{"DES-EDE3-CBC", EVP_des_ede3_cbc},
{"ChaCha20-Poly1305", EVP_chacha20_poly1305},
};
class RandomizedCipherTest : public testing::TestWithParam<CipherInfo> {};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
All, RandomizedCipherTest, testing::ValuesIn(kAllCiphers),
[](const testing::TestParamInfo<CipherInfo> &info) -> std::string {
std::string name = info.param.name;
std::replace(name.begin(), name.end(), '-', '_');
return name;
});
TEST_P(RandomizedCipherTest, EncryptDecrypt) {
if (runtimeEmulationIsIntelSde() && addressSanitizerIsEnabled()) {
GTEST_SKIP() << "Test not supported under Intel SDE + ASAN";
}
// This is an arbitrary max input size that I chose such that
// the test runs for about 2 seconds.
const size_t max_input_size = 1601;
const size_t num_tests_per_input_size = 10;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = GetParam().func();
ASSERT_TRUE(cipher);
const size_t key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
const size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher);
const uint32_t mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);
const bool is_aead = EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER;
const bool is_ccm = mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE;
const bool is_xts = mode == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE;
for (size_t pt_len = 0; pt_len <= max_input_size; pt_len++) {
// Filter based on cipher mode constraints.
if (is_xts && pt_len < 16) {
continue; // XTS requires at least 16 bytes
}
if (is_ccm && pt_len == 0) {
continue; // CCM requires non-empty plaintext for tag
}
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) &&
pt_len % block_size != 0) {
continue; // Block modes without padding require aligned input
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_tests_per_input_size; i++) {
// Generate random key, IV, plaintext, aad.
std::vector<uint8_t> key(key_len);
std::vector<uint8_t> iv(iv_len);
std::vector<uint8_t> plaintext(pt_len);
std::vector<uint8_t> aad;
RAND_bytes(key.data(), key_len);
if (iv_len > 0) {
RAND_bytes(iv.data(), iv_len);
}
if (pt_len > 0) {
RAND_bytes(plaintext.data(), pt_len);
}
if (is_aead) {
aad.resize(16);
RAND_bytes(aad.data(), aad.size());
}
// Encrypt
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
if (!is_xts) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0));
}
if (is_ccm) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, 16, nullptr));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, key.data(),
iv_len > 0 ? iv.data() : nullptr));
if (is_ccm) {
int len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, nullptr, pt_len));
}
if (!aad.empty()) {
int len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, aad.data(), aad.size()));
}
size_t max_ct_len = pt_len + block_size;
std::vector<uint8_t> ciphertext(max_ct_len);
int out_len = 0;
if (pt_len > 0) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ciphertext.data(), &out_len,
plaintext.data(), pt_len));
}
size_t ct_len = out_len;
int final_len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ciphertext.data() + ct_len, &final_len));
ct_len += final_len;
ciphertext.resize(ct_len);
std::vector<uint8_t> tag;
if (is_aead) {
tag.resize(16);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
tag.size(), tag.data()));
}
// Decrypt
ctx.reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
if (!is_xts) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0));
}
if (is_aead) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
tag.size(), tag.data()));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, key.data(),
iv_len > 0 ? iv.data() : nullptr));
if (is_ccm) {
int len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, nullptr, ct_len));
}
if (!aad.empty()) {
int len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, aad.data(), aad.size()));
}
std::vector<uint8_t> decrypted(ct_len + block_size);
out_len = 0;
if (ct_len > 0) {
int ret = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), decrypted.data(), &out_len,
ciphertext.data(), ct_len);
ASSERT_TRUE(ret);
}
size_t dec_len = out_len;
final_len = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), decrypted.data() + dec_len, &final_len));
dec_len += final_len;
decrypted.resize(dec_len);
// Verify the original plaintext is the same as the decrypted one.
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(plaintext), Bytes(decrypted));
}
}
}
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