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chore: checkpoint before Python removal

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Sienna Meridian Satterwhite
2026-03-26 22:33:59 +00:00
parent 683cec9307
commit e568ddf82a
29972 changed files with 11269302 additions and 2 deletions
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277
vendor/aws-lc-sys/aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cmac.c vendored Normal file
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// Copyright (c) 2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../../internal.h"
struct cmac_ctx_st {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
// k1 and k2 are the CMAC subkeys. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493#section-2.3
uint8_t k1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t k2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
// Last (possibly partial) scratch
uint8_t block[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
// block_used contains the number of valid bytes in |block|.
unsigned block_used;
};
static void CMAC_CTX_init(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
}
static void CMAC_CTX_cleanup(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k1, sizeof(ctx->k1));
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k2, sizeof(ctx->k2));
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->block, sizeof(ctx->block));
}
int AES_CMAC(uint8_t out[16], const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
switch (key_len) {
case 16:
cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case 32:
cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
default:
return 0;
}
// We have to verify that all the CMAC services actually succeed before
// updating the indicator state, so we lock the state here.
FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
size_t scratch_out_len;
CMAC_CTX ctx;
CMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
const int ok = CMAC_Init(&ctx, key, key_len, cipher, NULL /* engine */) &&
CMAC_Update(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
CMAC_Final(&ctx, out, &scratch_out_len);
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
if(ok) {
AES_CMAC_verify_service_indicator(&ctx);
}
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return ok;
}
CMAC_CTX *CMAC_CTX_new(void) {
CMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx != NULL) {
// NO-OP: struct already zeroed
//CMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
}
return ctx;
}
void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
int CMAC_CTX_copy(CMAC_CTX *out, const CMAC_CTX *in) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(&out->cipher_ctx, &in->cipher_ctx)) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out->k1, in->k1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out->k2, in->k2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
OPENSSL_memcpy(out->block, in->block, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
out->block_used = in->block_used;
return 1;
}
// binary_field_mul_x_128 treats the 128 bits at |in| as an element of GF(2¹²⁸)
// with a hard-coded reduction polynomial and sets |out| as x times the input.
//
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493#section-2.3
static void binary_field_mul_x_128(uint8_t out[16], const uint8_t in[16]) {
unsigned i;
// Shift |in| to left, including carry.
for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
out[i] = (in[i] << 1) | (in[i+1] >> 7);
}
// If MSB set fixup with R.
const uint8_t carry = in[0] >> 7;
out[i] = (in[i] << 1) ^ ((0 - carry) & 0x87);
}
// binary_field_mul_x_64 behaves like |binary_field_mul_x_128| but acts on an
// element of GF(2⁶⁴).
//
// See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf
static void binary_field_mul_x_64(uint8_t out[8], const uint8_t in[8]) {
unsigned i;
// Shift |in| to left, including carry.
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
out[i] = (in[i] << 1) | (in[i+1] >> 7);
}
// If MSB set fixup with R.
const uint8_t carry = in[0] >> 7;
out[i] = (in[i] << 1) ^ ((0 - carry) & 0x1b);
}
static const uint8_t kZeroIV[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *engine) {
// We have to avoid the underlying AES-CBC |EVP_CIPHER| services updating the
// indicator state, so we lock the state here.
FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
int ret = 0;
uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher);
if ((block_size != AES_BLOCK_SIZE && block_size != 8 /* 3-DES */) ||
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) != key_len ||
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, kZeroIV) ||
!EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, scratch, kZeroIV, block_size) ||
// Reset context again ready for first data.
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, kZeroIV)) {
goto end;
}
if (block_size == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
binary_field_mul_x_128(ctx->k1, scratch);
binary_field_mul_x_128(ctx->k2, ctx->k1);
} else {
binary_field_mul_x_64(ctx->k1, scratch);
binary_field_mul_x_64(ctx->k2, ctx->k1);
}
ctx->block_used = 0;
ret = 1;
end:
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
return ret;
}
int CMAC_Reset(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
ctx->block_used = 0;
return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, kZeroIV);
}
int CMAC_Update(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
// We have to avoid the underlying AES-CBC |EVP_Cipher| services updating the
// indicator state, so we lock the state here.
int ret = 0;
FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
assert(block_size <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
uint8_t scratch[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (ctx->block_used > 0) {
size_t todo = block_size - ctx->block_used;
if (in_len < todo) {
todo = in_len;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->block + ctx->block_used, in, todo);
in += todo;
in_len -= todo;
ctx->block_used += todo;
// If |in_len| is zero then either |ctx->block_used| is less than
// |block_size|, in which case we can stop here, or |ctx->block_used| is
// exactly |block_size| but there's no more data to process. In the latter
// case we don't want to process this block now because it might be the last
// block and that block is treated specially.
if (in_len == 0) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
assert(ctx->block_used == block_size);
if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, scratch, ctx->block, block_size)) {
goto end;
}
}
// Encrypt all but one of the remaining blocks.
while (in_len > block_size) {
if (!EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, scratch, in, block_size)) {
goto end;
}
in += block_size;
in_len -= block_size;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->block, in, in_len);
// |in_len| is bounded by |block_size|, which fits in |unsigned|.
OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH < UINT_MAX,
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH_is_too_large);
ctx->block_used = (unsigned)in_len;
ret = 1;
end:
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
return ret;
}
int CMAC_Final(CMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
// We have to avoid the underlying AES-CBC |EVP_Cipher| services updating the
// indicator state, so we lock the state here.
FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
int ret = 0;
size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
assert(block_size <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
*out_len = block_size;
if (out == NULL) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
const uint8_t *mask = ctx->k1;
if (ctx->block_used != block_size) {
// If the last block is incomplete, terminate it with a single 'one' bit
// followed by zeros.
ctx->block[ctx->block_used] = 0x80;
OPENSSL_memset(ctx->block + ctx->block_used + 1, 0,
block_size - (ctx->block_used + 1));
mask = ctx->k2;
}
for (unsigned i = 0; i < block_size; i++) {
out[i] = ctx->block[i] ^ mask[i];
}
ret = EVP_Cipher(&ctx->cipher_ctx, out, out, block_size);
end:
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
if(ret) {
AES_CMAC_verify_service_indicator(ctx);
}
return ret;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx) {
return &ctx->cipher_ctx;
}

256
vendor/aws-lc-sys/aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cmac_test.cc vendored Normal file
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// Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC
#include <stdio.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "../../test/file_test.h"
#include "../../test/test_util.h"
#include "../../test/wycheproof_util.h"
static void test(const char *name, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *expected) {
SCOPED_TRACE(name);
// Test the single-shot API.
uint8_t out[16];
ASSERT_TRUE(AES_CMAC(out, key, key_len, msg, msg_len));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected, sizeof(out)), Bytes(out));
bssl::UniquePtr<CMAC_CTX> ctx(CMAC_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Init(ctx.get(), key, key_len, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL));
for (unsigned chunk_size = 1; chunk_size <= msg_len; chunk_size++) {
SCOPED_TRACE(chunk_size);
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Reset(ctx.get()));
size_t done = 0;
while (done < msg_len) {
size_t todo = std::min(msg_len - done, static_cast<size_t>(chunk_size));
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), msg + done, todo));
done += todo;
}
size_t out_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Final(ctx.get(), out, &out_len));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected, sizeof(out)), Bytes(out, out_len));
}
// Test that |CMAC_CTX_copy| works.
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Reset(ctx.get()));
size_t chunk = msg_len / 2;
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), msg, chunk));
bssl::UniquePtr<CMAC_CTX> ctx2(CMAC_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx2);
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_CTX_copy(ctx2.get(), ctx.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx2.get(), msg + chunk, msg_len - chunk));
size_t out_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Final(ctx2.get(), out, &out_len));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(expected, sizeof(out)), Bytes(out, out_len));
}
TEST(CMACTest, RFC4493TestVectors) {
static const uint8_t kKey[16] = {
0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c,
};
static const uint8_t kOut1[16] = {
0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28,
0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46,
};
static const uint8_t kMsg2[] = {
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
};
static const uint8_t kOut2[16] = {
0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x44,
0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c,
};
static const uint8_t kMsg3[] = {
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
};
static const uint8_t kOut3[16] = {
0xdf, 0xa6, 0x67, 0x47, 0xde, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0x30,
0x30, 0xca, 0x32, 0x61, 0x14, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x27,
};
static const uint8_t kMsg4[] = {
0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef,
0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17,
0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10,
};
static const uint8_t kOut4[16] = {
0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0x7e, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92,
0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe,
};
test("RFC 4493 #1", kKey, sizeof(kKey), NULL, 0, kOut1);
test("RFC 4493 #2", kKey, sizeof(kKey), kMsg2, sizeof(kMsg2), kOut2);
test("RFC 4493 #3", kKey, sizeof(kKey), kMsg3, sizeof(kMsg3), kOut3);
test("RFC 4493 #4", kKey, sizeof(kKey), kMsg4, sizeof(kMsg4), kOut4);
}
TEST(CMACTest, Wycheproof) {
FileTestGTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/aes_cmac_test.txt",
[](FileTest *t) {
std::string key_size, tag_size;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&key_size, "keySize"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&tag_size, "tagSize"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
std::vector<uint8_t> key, msg, tag;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "key"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&tag, "tag"));
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
switch (atoi(key_size.c_str())) {
case 128:
cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case 192:
cipher = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
break;
case 256:
cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
default:
// Some test vectors intentionally give the wrong key size. Our API
// requires the caller pick the sized CBC primitive, so these tests
// aren't useful for us.
EXPECT_FALSE(result.IsValid());
return;
}
size_t tag_len = static_cast<size_t>(atoi(tag_size.c_str())) / 8;
uint8_t out[16];
bssl::UniquePtr<CMAC_CTX> ctx(CMAC_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Init(ctx.get(), key.data(), key.size(), cipher, NULL));
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), msg.data(), msg.size()));
size_t out_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Final(ctx.get(), out, &out_len));
// Truncate the tag, if requested.
out_len = std::min(out_len, tag_len);
if (result.IsValid()) {
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out, out_len));
// Test the streaming API as well.
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Reset(ctx.get()));
for (uint8_t b : msg) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), &b, 1));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Final(ctx.get(), out, &out_len));
out_len = std::min(out_len, tag_len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out, out_len));
} else {
// Wycheproof's invalid tests assume the implementation internally does
// the comparison, whereas our API only computes the tag. Check that
// they're not equal, but these tests are mostly not useful for us.
EXPECT_NE(Bytes(tag), Bytes(out, out_len));
}
});
}
static void RunCAVPTest(const char *path, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
bool is_3des) {
FileTestGTest(path, [&](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAttribute("Count");
t->IgnoreAttribute("Klen");
std::string t_len, m_len, result;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&t_len, "Tlen"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&m_len, "Mlen"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetAttribute(&result, "Result"));
std::vector<uint8_t> key, msg, mac;
if (is_3des) {
std::vector<uint8_t> key2, key3;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "Key1"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key2, "Key2"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key3, "Key3"));
key.insert(key.end(), key2.begin(), key2.end());
key.insert(key.end(), key3.begin(), key3.end());
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&key, "Key"));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "Msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&mac, "Mac"));
// CAVP's uses a non-empty Msg attribute and zero Mlen for the empty string.
if (atoi(m_len.c_str()) == 0) {
msg.clear();
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(atoi(m_len.c_str())), msg.size());
}
size_t tag_len = static_cast<size_t>(atoi(t_len.c_str()));
uint8_t out[16];
bssl::UniquePtr<CMAC_CTX> ctx(CMAC_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Init(ctx.get(), key.data(), key.size(), cipher, NULL));
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), msg.data(), msg.size()));
size_t out_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Final(ctx.get(), out, &out_len));
// Truncate the tag, if requested.
out_len = std::min(out_len, tag_len);
ASSERT_FALSE(result.empty());
if (result[0] == 'P') {
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(mac), Bytes(out, out_len));
// Test the streaming API as well.
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Reset(ctx.get()));
for (uint8_t b : msg) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Update(ctx.get(), &b, 1));
}
ASSERT_TRUE(CMAC_Final(ctx.get(), out, &out_len));
out_len = std::min(out_len, tag_len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(mac), Bytes(out, out_len));
} else {
// CAVP's invalid tests assume the implementation internally does the
// comparison, whereas our API only computes the tag. Check that they're
// not equal, but these tests are mostly not useful for us.
EXPECT_NE(Bytes(mac), Bytes(out, out_len));
}
});
}
TEST(CMACTest, CAVPAES128) {
RunCAVPTest("crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_aes128_cmac_tests.txt", EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
false);
}
TEST(CMACTest, CAVPAES192) {
RunCAVPTest("crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_aes192_cmac_tests.txt", EVP_aes_192_cbc(),
false);
}
TEST(CMACTest, CAVPAES256) {
RunCAVPTest("crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_aes256_cmac_tests.txt", EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
false);
}
TEST(CMACTest, CAVP3DES) {
RunCAVPTest("crypto/fipsmodule/cmac/cavp_3des_cmac_tests.txt", EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), true);
}