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chore: checkpoint before Python removal

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This commit is contained in:
Sienna Meridian Satterwhite
2026-03-26 22:33:59 +00:00
parent 683cec9307
commit e568ddf82a
29972 changed files with 11269302 additions and 2 deletions
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104
vendor/aws-lc-sys/aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/pbkdf/pbkdf.c vendored Normal file
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// Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project 1999.
// Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *password, size_t password_len,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, uint32_t iterations,
const EVP_MD *digest, size_t key_len, uint8_t *out_key) {
// See RFC 8018, section 5.2.
int ret = 0;
size_t md_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
uint32_t i = 1;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
// We have to avoid the underlying SHA services updating the indicator
// state, so we lock the state here.
FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, password, password_len, digest, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
while (key_len > 0) {
size_t todo = md_len;
if (todo > key_len) {
todo = key_len;
}
uint8_t i_buf[4];
i_buf[0] = (uint8_t)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
i_buf[1] = (uint8_t)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
i_buf[2] = (uint8_t)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
i_buf[3] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff);
// Compute U_1.
uint8_t digest_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, salt_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hctx, i_buf, 4) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest_tmp, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key, digest_tmp, todo);
for (uint32_t j = 1; j < iterations; j++) {
// Compute the remaining U_* values and XOR.
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digest_tmp, md_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest_tmp, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
for (size_t k = 0; k < todo; k++) {
out_key[k] ^= digest_tmp[k];
}
}
key_len -= todo;
out_key += todo;
i++;
}
// RFC 8018 describes iterations (c) as being a "positive integer", so a
// value of 0 is an error.
//
// Unfortunately not all consumers of PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() check their return
// value, expecting it to succeed and unconditionally using |out_key|. As a
// precaution for such callsites in external code, the old behavior of
// iterations < 1 being treated as iterations == 1 is preserved, but
// additionally an error result is returned.
//
// TODO(eroman): Figure out how to remove this compatibility hack, or change
// the default to something more sensible like 2048.
if (iterations == 0) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (ret) {
PBKDF2_verify_service_indicator(digest, password_len, salt_len, iterations);
}
return ret;
}
int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *password, size_t password_len,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
uint32_t iterations, size_t key_len,
uint8_t *out_key) {
return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, password_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
EVP_sha1(), key_len, out_key);
}

150
vendor/aws-lc-sys/aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/pbkdf/pbkdf_test.cc vendored Normal file
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// Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../../test/test_util.h"
// Tests deriving a key using an empty password (specified both as NULL and as
// non-NULL). Note that NULL has special meaning to HMAC initialization.
TEST(PBKDFTest, EmptyPassword) {
const uint8_t kKey[] = {0xa3, 0x3d, 0xdd, 0xc3, 0x04, 0x78, 0x18,
0x55, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x87, 0x52, 0x89,
0x5d, 0x36, 0xea, 0x43, 0x63, 0xa2};
uint8_t key[sizeof(kKey)];
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(NULL, 0, (const uint8_t *)"salt", 4, 1,
EVP_sha1(), sizeof(kKey), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey), Bytes(key));
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("", 0, (const uint8_t *)"salt", 4, 1,
EVP_sha1(), sizeof(kKey), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey), Bytes(key));
}
// Tests deriving a key using an empty salt. Note that the expectation was
// generated using OpenSSL itself, and hence is not verified.
TEST(PBKDFTest, EmptySalt) {
const uint8_t kKey[] = {0x8b, 0xc2, 0xf9, 0x16, 0x7a, 0x81, 0xcd, 0xcf,
0xad, 0x12, 0x35, 0xcd, 0x90, 0x47, 0xf1, 0x13,
0x62, 0x71, 0xc1, 0xf9, 0x78, 0xfc, 0xfc, 0xb3,
0x5e, 0x22, 0xdb, 0xea, 0xfa, 0x46, 0x34, 0xf6};
uint8_t key[sizeof(kKey)];
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("password", 8, NULL, 0, 2, EVP_sha256(),
sizeof(kKey), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey), Bytes(key));
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("password", 8, (const uint8_t *)"", 0, 2,
EVP_sha256(), sizeof(kKey), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey), Bytes(key));
}
// Exercises test vectors taken from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070.
// Note that each of these test vectors uses SHA-1 as the digest.
TEST(PBKDFTest, RFC6070Vectors) {
const uint8_t kKey1[] = {0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e,
0x71, 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60,
0x12, 0x06, 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x37, 0xa6};
const uint8_t kKey2[] = {0xea, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x4d, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x6f,
0x8c, 0xcd, 0x1e, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0xce, 0x1d,
0x41, 0xf0, 0xd8, 0xde, 0x89, 0x57};
const uint8_t kKey3[] = {0x56, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xa7, 0x55, 0x48, 0x09, 0x9d,
0xcc, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xc3};
const uint8_t kKey4[] = {0x3d, 0x2e, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xe4, 0x1c, 0x84, 0x9b,
0x80, 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x62, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x4a,
0x8b, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x96, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x70,
0x38};
uint8_t key[sizeof(kKey4)];
static_assert(sizeof(key) >= sizeof(kKey1), "output too small");
static_assert(sizeof(key) >= sizeof(kKey2), "output too small");
static_assert(sizeof(key) >= sizeof(kKey3), "output too small");
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("password", 8, (const uint8_t *)"salt", 4, 1,
EVP_sha1(), sizeof(kKey1), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey1), Bytes(key, sizeof(kKey1)));
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("password", 8, (const uint8_t *)"salt", 4, 2,
EVP_sha1(), sizeof(kKey2), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey2), Bytes(key, sizeof(kKey2)));
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("pass\0word", 9, (const uint8_t *)"sa\0lt", 5,
4096, EVP_sha1(), sizeof(kKey3), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey3), Bytes(key, sizeof(kKey3)));
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
(const uint8_t *)"saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36,
4096, EVP_sha1(), sizeof(kKey4), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey4), Bytes(key, sizeof(kKey4)));
}
// Tests key derivation using SHA-2 digests.
TEST(PBKDFTest, SHA2) {
// This test was taken from:
// http://stackoverflow.com/questions/5130513/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.
const uint8_t kKey1[] = {0xae, 0x4d, 0x0c, 0x95, 0xaf, 0x6b, 0x46, 0xd3,
0x2d, 0x0a, 0xdf, 0xf9, 0x28, 0xf0, 0x6d, 0xd0,
0x2a, 0x30, 0x3f, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0xc2, 0x51, 0xdf,
0xd6, 0xe2, 0xd8, 0x5a, 0x95, 0x47, 0x4c, 0x43};
// This test was taken from:
// http://stackoverflow.com/questions/15593184/pbkdf2-hmac-sha-512-test-vectors.
const uint8_t kKey2[] = {
0x8c, 0x05, 0x11, 0xf4, 0xc6, 0xe5, 0x97, 0xc6, 0xac, 0x63, 0x15,
0xd8, 0xf0, 0x36, 0x2e, 0x22, 0x5f, 0x3c, 0x50, 0x14, 0x95, 0xba,
0x23, 0xb8, 0x68, 0xc0, 0x05, 0x17, 0x4d, 0xc4, 0xee, 0x71, 0x11,
0x5b, 0x59, 0xf9, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0xd9, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xa3, 0x3e, 0x0f,
0x75, 0xae, 0xfe, 0x30, 0x22, 0x5c, 0x58, 0x3a, 0x18, 0x6c, 0xd8,
0x2b, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xea, 0x97, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xd3, 0xb8};
uint8_t key[sizeof(kKey2)];
static_assert(sizeof(key) >= sizeof(kKey1), "output too small");
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("password", 8, (const uint8_t *)"salt", 4, 2,
EVP_sha256(), sizeof(kKey1), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey1), Bytes(key, sizeof(kKey1)));
ASSERT_TRUE(
PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC("passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
(const uint8_t *)"saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt",
36, 4096, EVP_sha512(), sizeof(kKey2), key));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kKey2), Bytes(key, sizeof(kKey2)));
}
// Tests key derivation using iterations=0.
//
// RFC 2898 defines the iteration count (c) as a "positive integer". So doing a
// key derivation with iterations=0 is ill-defined and should result in a
// failure.
TEST(PBKDFTest, ZeroIterations) {
static const char kPassword[] = "password";
const size_t password_len = strlen(kPassword);
static const uint8_t kSalt[] = {1, 2, 3, 4};
const size_t salt_len = sizeof(kSalt);
const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_sha1();
uint8_t key[10] = {0};
const size_t key_len = sizeof(key);
// Verify that calling with iterations=1 works.
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(kPassword, password_len, kSalt, salt_len,
1 /* iterations */, digest, key_len, key));
// Flip the first key byte (so can later test if it got set).
const uint8_t expected_first_byte = key[0];
key[0] = ~key[0];
// However calling it with iterations=0 fails.
ASSERT_FALSE(PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(kPassword, password_len, kSalt, salt_len,
0 /* iterations */, digest, key_len, key));
// For backwards compatibility, the iterations == 0 case still fills in
// the out key.
EXPECT_EQ(expected_first_byte, key[0]);
}