// Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) All rights reserved. // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 #include #include #include #include "../../internal.h" #include "../evp/internal.h" #include "internal.h" void EVP_MD_unstable_sha3_enable(bool enable) { // no-op } bool EVP_MD_unstable_sha3_is_enabled(void) { return true; } int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->type; } int EVP_MD_nid(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_type(md); } uint32_t EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->flags; } size_t EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->md_size; } size_t EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->block_size; } void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); } EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); if (ctx) { // NO-OP: struct already zeroed //EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); } return ctx; } EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void) { return EVP_MD_CTX_new(); } int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) { return 1; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data); assert(ctx->pctx == NULL || ctx->pctx_ops != NULL); // |pctx| should be freed by the user of |EVP_MD_CTX| if // |EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX| is set. Everything other than the external |pctx| that |ctx->pctx| was pointing to is cleaned up when the flag is set. if (ctx->pctx_ops && !(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX)) { ctx->pctx_ops->free(ctx->pctx); } EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); return 1; } void EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_data == NULL || ctx->digest == NULL) { return; } OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); } void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) { return; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); } // EVP_DigestFinalXOF is a single-call XOF output generation function. // The |ctx->digest| check prevents calling EVP_DigestFinalXOF consecutively. // To catch single-call XOF EVP_DigestFinalXOF calls after |EVP_DigestSqueeze|, // the return |SHAKE_Final| value is used (the check is internally performed via // the |KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx| state flag). int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) { if (ctx->digest == NULL) { return 0; } if ((EVP_MD_flags(ctx->digest) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } int ok = ctx->digest->finalXOF(ctx, out, len); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(ctx); return ok; } // EVP_DigestSqueeze is a streaming XOF output squeeze function // It can be called multiple times to generate an output of length // |len| bytes. int EVP_DigestSqueeze(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) { if (ctx->digest == NULL) { return 0; } if ((EVP_MD_flags(ctx->digest) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } ctx->digest->squeezeXOF(ctx, out, len); return 1; } uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); } void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {} int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) { // |in->digest| may be NULL if this is a signing |EVP_MD_CTX| for, e.g., // Ed25519 which does not hash with |EVP_MD_CTX|. if (in == NULL || (in->pctx == NULL && in->digest == NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, DIGEST_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; assert(in->pctx == NULL || in->pctx_ops != NULL); if (in->pctx) { pctx = in->pctx_ops->dup(in->pctx); if (!pctx) { return 0; } } uint8_t *tmp_buf = NULL; if (in->digest != NULL) { if (out->digest != in->digest) { assert(in->digest->ctx_size != 0); tmp_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(in->digest->ctx_size); if (tmp_buf == NULL) { if (pctx) { in->pctx_ops->free(pctx); } return 0; } } else { // |md_data| will be the correct size in this case. It's removed from // |out| so that |EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup| doesn't free it, and then it's // reused. tmp_buf = out->md_data; out->md_data = NULL; } } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out); out->digest = in->digest; out->md_data = tmp_buf; if (in->digest != NULL && in->md_data != NULL) { OPENSSL_memcpy(out->md_data, in->md_data, in->digest->ctx_size); } out->update = in->update; out->flags = in->flags; // copied |EVP_MD_CTX| should free its newly allocated |EVP_PKEY_CTX|. out->flags &= ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX; out->pctx = pctx; out->pctx_ops = in->pctx_ops; assert(out->pctx == NULL || out->pctx_ops != NULL); return 1; } void EVP_MD_CTX_move(EVP_MD_CTX *out, EVP_MD_CTX *in) { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out); // While not guaranteed, |EVP_MD_CTX| is currently safe to move with |memcpy|. OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); EVP_MD_CTX_init(in); } int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) { EVP_MD_CTX_init(out); return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in); } int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); return 1; } int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *engine) { if (ctx->digest != type) { ctx->digest = type; if (!used_for_hmac(ctx)) { assert(type->ctx_size != 0); ctx->update = type->update; uint8_t *md_data = OPENSSL_malloc(type->ctx_size); if (md_data == NULL) { return 0; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data); ctx->md_data = md_data; } } assert(ctx->pctx == NULL || ctx->pctx_ops != NULL); if (used_for_hmac(ctx)) { // These configurations are specific to |EVP_PKEY_HMAC|. |HMAC_PKEY_CTX| is // newly allocated by |EVP_DigestSignInit| at this point. The actual key // data is stored in |ctx->pkey| as |HMAC_KEY|. if (ctx->pctx == NULL || ctx->pctx->data == NULL || ctx->pctx->pkey == NULL || ctx->pctx->pkey->pkey.ptr == NULL) { return 0; } const HMAC_KEY *key = ctx->pctx->pkey->pkey.ptr; HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hmac_pctx = ctx->pctx->data; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_pctx->ctx, key->key, key->key_len, hmac_pctx->md, ctx->pctx->engine)) { return 0; } return 1; } ctx->digest->init(ctx); return 1; } int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type) { EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL); } int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t len) { if (ctx->update == NULL) { return 0; } return ctx->update(ctx, data, len); } int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out, unsigned int *size) { if (ctx->digest == NULL) { return 0; } if (EVP_MD_flags(ctx->digest) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ctx->digest->final(ctx, md_out); if (size != NULL) { *size = ctx->digest->md_size; } OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); return 1; } int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md, unsigned int *size) { int ok = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return ok; } int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count, uint8_t *out_md, unsigned int *out_size, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) { EVP_MD_CTX ctx; int ret; if ((EVP_MD_flags(type) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) && out_size == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, type, impl) && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, count); if (ret == 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return 0; } if (EVP_MD_flags(type) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) { ret &= EVP_DigestFinalXOF(&ctx, out_md, *out_size); } else { ret &= EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, out_md, out_size); } return ret; } const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) { return NULL; } return ctx->digest; } size_t EVP_MD_CTX_size(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)); } size_t EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_block_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)); } int EVP_MD_CTX_type(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)); } int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *digest) { return 1; }