551 lines
16 KiB
C
551 lines
16 KiB
C
// Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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// Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../cpucap/internal.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
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(defined(OPENSSL_LINUX) || defined(OPENSSL_APPLE) || \
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defined(OPENSSL_OPENBSD) || defined(OPENSSL_FREEBSD) || \
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defined(OPENSSL_NETBSD) ) && \
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defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) && defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
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#include "../../../third_party/s2n-bignum/s2n-bignum_aws-lc.h"
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#define BN_MONTGOMERY_S2N_BIGNUM_CAPABLE 1
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OPENSSL_INLINE int montgomery_use_s2n_bignum(unsigned int num) {
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// Use s2n-bignum's functions only if
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// (1) The ARM architecture has slow multipliers, and
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// (2) num (which is the number of words) is multiplie of 8, because
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// s2n-bignum's bignum_emontredc_8n requires it, and
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// (3) The word size is 64 bits.
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// (4) CPU has NEON.
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assert(S2NBIGNUM_KSQR_16_32_TEMP_NWORDS <= S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS &&
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S2NBIGNUM_KSQR_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS <= S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS &&
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S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_16_32_TEMP_NWORDS <= S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS);
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assert(BN_BITS2 == 64);
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return !CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_wide_multiplier_capable() &&
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(num % 8 == 0) &&
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CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable();
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}
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#else
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OPENSSL_INLINE int montgomery_use_s2n_bignum(unsigned int num) {
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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void bn_mont_ctx_init(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
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OPENSSL_memset(mont, 0, sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX));
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BN_init(&mont->RR);
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BN_init(&mont->N);
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}
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void bn_mont_ctx_cleanup(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
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BN_free(&mont->RR);
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BN_free(&mont->N);
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}
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BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void) {
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BN_MONT_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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bn_mont_ctx_init(ret);
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return ret;
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}
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void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
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if (mont == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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bn_mont_ctx_cleanup(mont);
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OPENSSL_free(mont);
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}
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BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, const BN_MONT_CTX *from) {
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if (to == from) {
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return to;
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}
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if (!BN_copy(&to->RR, &from->RR) ||
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!BN_copy(&to->N, &from->N)) {
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return NULL;
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}
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to->n0[0] = from->n0[0];
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to->n0[1] = from->n0[1];
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return to;
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}
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static int bn_mont_ctx_set_N_and_n0(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod) {
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if (BN_is_zero(mod)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!BN_is_odd(mod)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
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return 0;
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}
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if (BN_is_negative(mod)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!bn_fits_in_words(mod, BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
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return 0;
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}
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// Save the modulus.
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if (!BN_copy(&mont->N, mod)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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// |mont->N| is always stored minimally. Computing RR efficiently leaks the
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// size of the modulus. While the modulus may be private in RSA (one of the
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// primes), their sizes are public, so this is fine.
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bn_set_minimal_width(&mont->N);
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// Find n0 such that n0 * N == -1 (mod r).
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//
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// Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1]. For the
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// others, we could use a shorter R value and use faster |BN_ULONG|-based
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// math instead of |uint64_t|-based math, which would be double-precision.
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// However, currently only the assembler files know which is which.
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
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BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_value_is_invalid)
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OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
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sizeof(BN_ULONG) * BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == sizeof(uint64_t),
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uint64_t_is_insufficient_precision_for_n0);
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uint64_t n0 = bn_mont_n0(&mont->N);
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mont->n0[0] = (BN_ULONG)n0;
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#if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
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mont->n0[1] = (BN_ULONG)(n0 >> BN_BITS2);
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#else
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mont->n0[1] = 0;
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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if (!bn_mont_ctx_set_N_and_n0(mont, mod)) {
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return 0;
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}
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BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (new_ctx == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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ctx = new_ctx;
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}
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// Save RR = R**2 (mod N). R is the smallest power of 2**BN_BITS2 such that R
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// > mod. Even though the assembly on some 32-bit platforms works with 64-bit
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// values, using |BN_BITS2| here, rather than |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS *
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// BN_BITS2|, is correct because R**2 will still be a multiple of the latter
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// as |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| is either one or two.
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unsigned lgBigR = mont->N.width * BN_BITS2;
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BN_zero(&mont->RR);
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int ok = BN_set_bit(&mont->RR, lgBigR * 2) &&
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BN_mod(&mont->RR, &mont->RR, &mont->N, ctx) &&
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bn_resize_words(&mont->RR, mont->N.width);
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BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
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return ok;
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}
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BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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BN_MONT_CTX *mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
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if (mont == NULL ||
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!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, mod, ctx)) {
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
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return NULL;
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}
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return mont;
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}
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BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new_consttime(const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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BN_MONT_CTX *mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
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if (mont == NULL ||
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!bn_mont_ctx_set_N_and_n0(mont, mod) ||
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!bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime(mont, ctx)) {
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BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
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return NULL;
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}
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return mont;
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}
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int BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, CRYPTO_MUTEX *lock,
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const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *bn_ctx) {
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(lock);
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BN_MONT_CTX *ctx = *pmont;
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(lock);
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if (ctx) {
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return 1;
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}
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(lock);
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if (*pmont == NULL) {
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*pmont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(mod, bn_ctx);
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}
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const int ok = *pmont != NULL;
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(lock);
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return ok;
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}
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int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
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BN_CTX *ctx) {
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return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(ret, a, &mont->RR, mont, ctx);
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}
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static int bn_from_montgomery_in_place(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, BN_ULONG *a,
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size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
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const BN_ULONG *n = mont->N.d;
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size_t num_n = mont->N.width;
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if (num_r != num_n || num_a != 2 * num_n) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
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return 0;
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}
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// Add multiples of |n| to |r| until R = 2^(nl * BN_BITS2) divides it. On
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// input, we had |r| < |n| * R, so now |r| < 2 * |n| * R. Note that |r|
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// includes |carry| which is stored separately.
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BN_ULONG n0 = mont->n0[0];
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BN_ULONG carry = 0;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num_n; i++) {
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BN_ULONG v = bn_mul_add_words(a + i, n, num_n, a[i] * n0);
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v += carry + a[i + num_n];
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carry |= (v != a[i + num_n]);
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carry &= (v <= a[i + num_n]);
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a[i + num_n] = v;
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}
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// Shift |num_n| words to divide by R. We have |a| < 2 * |n|. Note that |a|
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// includes |carry| which is stored separately.
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a += num_n;
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// |a| thus requires at most one additional subtraction |n| to be reduced.
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bn_reduce_once(r, a, carry, n, num_n);
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return 1;
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}
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static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
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if (r->neg) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
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return 0;
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}
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const BIGNUM *n = &mont->N;
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if (n->width == 0) {
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ret->width = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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int max = 2 * n->width; // carry is stored separately
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if (!bn_resize_words(r, max) ||
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!bn_wexpand(ret, n->width)) {
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return 0;
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}
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ret->width = n->width;
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ret->neg = 0;
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return bn_from_montgomery_in_place(ret->d, ret->width, r->d, r->width, mont);
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}
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int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
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BN_CTX *ctx) {
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int ret = 0;
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BIGNUM *t;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (t == NULL ||
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!BN_copy(t, a)) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = BN_from_montgomery_word(r, t, mont);
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err:
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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int bn_one_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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// If the high bit of |n| is set, R = 2^(width*BN_BITS2) < 2 * |n|, so we
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// compute R - |n| rather than perform Montgomery reduction.
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const BIGNUM *n = &mont->N;
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if (n->width > 0 && (n->d[n->width - 1] >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) != 0) {
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if (!bn_wexpand(r, n->width)) {
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return 0;
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}
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r->d[0] = 0 - n->d[0];
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for (int i = 1; i < n->width; i++) {
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r->d[i] = ~n->d[i];
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}
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r->width = n->width;
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r->neg = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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return BN_from_montgomery(r, &mont->RR, mont, ctx);
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}
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static int bn_mod_mul_montgomery_fallback(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
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const BIGNUM *b,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
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BN_CTX *ctx) {
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (tmp == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (a == b) {
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if (!bn_sqr_consttime(tmp, a, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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if (!bn_mul_consttime(tmp, a, b, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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// reduce from aRR to aR
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if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont)) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
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// Perform montgomery multiplication using s2n-bignum functions. The arguments
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// are equivalent to the arguments of bn_mul_mont.
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// montgomery_s2n_bignum_mul_mont works only if num is a multiple of 8.
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// montgomery_use_s2n_bignum(num) must be called in advance to check this
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// condition, as well as other s2n-bignum requirements.
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// For num = 32 or num = 16, this uses faster primitives in s2n-bignum.
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// montgomery_s2n_bignum_mul_mont allocates S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS +
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// 2 * BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS uint64_t words at the stack.
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static void montgomery_s2n_bignum_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
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const BN_ULONG *bp,
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const BN_ULONG *np,
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const BN_ULONG *n0, size_t num) {
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#if defined(BN_MONTGOMERY_S2N_BIGNUM_CAPABLE)
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// t is a temporary buffer used by Karatsuba multiplication.
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// bignum_kmul_32_64 requires S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS words.
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uint64_t t[S2NBIGNUM_KMUL_32_64_TEMP_NWORDS];
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// mulres is the output buffer of big-int multiplication which uses
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// 2 * num elements of mulres. Note that num <= BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS
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// is guaranteed by the caller (BN_mod_mul_montgomery).
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uint64_t mulres[2 * BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS];
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// Given m the prime number stored at np, m * w = -1 mod 2^64.
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uint64_t w = n0[0];
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if (num == 32) {
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if (ap == bp) {
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bignum_ksqr_32_64(mulres, ap, t);
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} else {
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bignum_kmul_32_64(mulres, ap, bp, t);
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}
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} else if (num == 16) {
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if (ap == bp) {
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bignum_ksqr_16_32(mulres, ap, t);
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} else {
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bignum_kmul_16_32(mulres, ap, bp, t);
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}
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} else {
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if (ap == bp) {
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bignum_sqr(num * 2, mulres, num, ap);
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} else {
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bignum_mul(num * 2, mulres, num, ap, num, bp);
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}
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}
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// Do montgomery reduction. We follow the definition of montgomery reduction
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// which is:
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// 1. Calculate (mulres + ((mulres mod R) * (-m^-1 mod R) mod R) * m) / R
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// using bignum_emontredc_8n, where R is 2^(64*num).
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// The calculated result is stored in [mulres+num ... mulres+2*num-1]. If
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// the result >= 2^(64*num), bignum_emontredc_8n returns 1.
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// 2. Optionally subtract the result if the (result of step 1) >= m.
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// The comparison is true if either A or B holds:
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// A. The result of step 1 >= 2^(64*num), meaning that bignum_emontredc_8n
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// returned 1. Since m is less than 2^(64*num), (result of step 1) >= m holds.
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// B. The result of step 1 fits in 2^(64*num), and the result >= m.
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uint64_t c = bignum_emontredc_8n(num, mulres, np, w); // c: case A
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c |= bignum_ge(num, mulres + num, num, np); // c: case B
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// Optionally subtract and store the result at rp
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bignum_optsub(num, rp, mulres + num, c, np);
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#else
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// Should not call this function unless s2n-bignum is supported.
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abort();
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#endif
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}
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#endif
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int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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if (a->neg || b->neg) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
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return 0;
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}
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#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
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// |bn_mul_mont| requires at least 128 bits of limbs, at least for x86.
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int num = mont->N.width;
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if (num >= (128 / BN_BITS2) &&
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a->width == num &&
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b->width == num) {
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if (!bn_wexpand(r, num)) {
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return 0;
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}
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// This bound is implied by |bn_mont_ctx_set_N_and_n0|. |bn_mul_mont|
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// allocates |num| words on the stack, so |num| cannot be too large.
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assert((size_t)num <= BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS);
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if (montgomery_use_s2n_bignum(num)) {
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// Do montgomery multiplication using s2n-bignum.
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montgomery_s2n_bignum_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0,
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num);
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} else {
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if (!bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
|
|
// The check above ensures this won't happen.
|
|
assert(0);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
r->neg = 0;
|
|
r->width = num;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return bn_mod_mul_montgomery_fallback(r, a, b, mont, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int bn_less_than_montgomery_R(const BIGNUM *bn, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
|
|
return !BN_is_negative(bn) &&
|
|
bn_fits_in_words(bn, mont->N.width);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
|
|
const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
|
|
bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(r, a, mont->RR.d, num, mont);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
|
|
size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
|
|
if (num_r != (size_t)mont->N.width || num_r > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS ||
|
|
num_a > 2 * num_r) {
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
BN_ULONG tmp[BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS * 2] = {0};
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp, a, num_a * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
if (!bn_from_montgomery_in_place(r, num_r, tmp, 2 * num_r, mont)) {
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, 2 * num_r * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
|
|
const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num,
|
|
const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
|
|
if (num != (size_t)mont->N.width || num > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
|
|
// |bn_mul_mont| requires at least 128 bits of limbs, at least for x86.
|
|
if (num >= (128 / BN_BITS2)) {
|
|
if (!bn_mul_mont(r, a, b, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
|
|
abort(); // The check above ensures this won't happen.
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
// Compute the product.
|
|
BN_ULONG tmp[2 * BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
|
|
if (a == b) {
|
|
bn_sqr_small(tmp, 2 * num, a, num);
|
|
} else {
|
|
bn_mul_small(tmp, 2 * num, a, num, b, num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reduce.
|
|
if (!bn_from_montgomery_in_place(r, num, tmp, 2 * num, mont)) {
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, 2 * num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
|
|
int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
|
|
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, size_t num)
|
|
{
|
|
#if !defined(MY_ASSEMBLER_IS_TOO_OLD_FOR_512AVX)
|
|
if (ap == bp && bn_sqr8x_mont_capable(num)) {
|
|
return bn_sqr8x_mont(rp, ap, bn_mulx_adx_capable(), np, n0, num);
|
|
}
|
|
if (bn_mulx4x_mont_capable(num)) {
|
|
return bn_mulx4x_mont(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // !defined(MY_ASSEMBLER_IS_TOO_OLD_FOR_512AVX)
|
|
if (bn_mul4x_mont_capable(num)) {
|
|
return bn_mul4x_mont(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
|
|
}
|
|
return bn_mul_mont_nohw(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
|
|
int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
|
|
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, size_t num) {
|
|
if (bn_mul8x_mont_neon_capable(num)) {
|
|
return bn_mul8x_mont_neon(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
|
|
}
|
|
return bn_mul_mont_nohw(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|