658 lines
21 KiB
C++
658 lines
21 KiB
C++
// Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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// Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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// Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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//
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// ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
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// SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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//
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <utility>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
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SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
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: ssl(ssl_arg),
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ech_is_inner(false),
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ech_authenticated_reject(false),
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scts_requested(false),
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received_custom_extension(false),
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handshake_finalized(false),
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accept_psk_mode(false),
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cert_request(false),
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certificate_status_expected(false),
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ocsp_stapling_requested(false),
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should_ack_sni(false),
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in_false_start(false),
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in_early_data(false),
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early_data_offered(false),
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can_early_read(false),
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can_early_write(false),
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next_proto_neg_seen(false),
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ticket_expected(false),
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extended_master_secret(false),
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pending_private_key_op(false),
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handback(false),
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hints_requested(false),
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cert_compression_negotiated(false),
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apply_jdk11_workaround(false),
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can_release_private_key(false),
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channel_id_negotiated(false) {
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assert(ssl);
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// Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling
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// |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a
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// connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after
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// HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent.
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RAND_bytes(grease_seed, sizeof(grease_seed));
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}
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SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {}
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void SSL_HANDSHAKE::ResizeSecrets(size_t hash_len) {
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if (hash_len > SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
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abort();
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}
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hash_len_ = hash_len;
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}
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bool SSL_HANDSHAKE::GetClientHello(SSLMessage *out_msg,
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SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out_client_hello) {
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if (!ech_client_hello_buf.empty()) {
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// If the backing buffer is non-empty, the ClientHelloInner has been set.
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out_msg->is_v2_hello = false;
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out_msg->type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
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out_msg->raw = CBS(ech_client_hello_buf);
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out_msg->body = MakeConstSpan(ech_client_hello_buf).subspan(4);
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} else if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, out_msg)) {
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// The message has already been read, so this cannot fail.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return false;
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}
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if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, out_client_hello, out_msg->body)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
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UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
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if (!hs || !hs->transcript.Init()) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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hs->config = ssl->config.get();
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if (!hs->config) {
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assert(hs->config);
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return nullptr;
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}
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return hs;
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}
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bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
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if (msg.type != type) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
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Array<uint8_t> msg;
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if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) ||
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!ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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// kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
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// not accept peer certificate chains.
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static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
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if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
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SSL_CONFIG *config = ssl->config.get(); // SSL_in_init() implies not NULL.
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if ((!ssl->server || (config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
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kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
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return ssl->max_cert_list;
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}
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return kMaxMessageLen;
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}
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if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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// In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
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// a HelloRequest.
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return 0;
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}
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if (ssl->server) {
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// The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
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// KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth.
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return 1;
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}
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// Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size or
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// max_cert_list, whichever is greater.
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return std::max(kMaxMessageLen, size_t{ssl->max_cert_list});
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}
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bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
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// V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed.
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if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
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return true;
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}
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return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw);
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}
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bool ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
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std::initializer_list<SSLExtension *> extensions,
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bool ignore_unknown) {
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// Reset everything.
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for (SSLExtension *ext : extensions) {
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ext->present = false;
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CBS_init(&ext->data, nullptr, 0);
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if (!ext->allowed) {
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assert(!ignore_unknown);
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}
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}
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CBS copy = *cbs;
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while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
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uint16_t type;
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CBS data;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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return false;
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}
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SSLExtension *found = nullptr;
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for (SSLExtension *ext : extensions) {
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if (type == ext->type && ext->allowed) {
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found = ext;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (found == nullptr) {
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if (ignore_unknown) {
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continue;
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}
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
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return false;
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}
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// Duplicate ext_types are forbidden.
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if (found->present) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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return false;
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}
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found->present = true;
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found->data = data;
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}
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return true;
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}
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enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
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if (prev_session != NULL) {
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// If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
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// https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
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// so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
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// changes on renegotiation.
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assert(!ssl->server);
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs.get()) !=
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get())) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return ssl_verify_invalid;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get());
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i++) {
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const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs.get(), i);
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const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), i);
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if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
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OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return ssl_verify_invalid;
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}
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}
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// The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
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// certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
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// authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
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// received.
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hs->new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(prev_session->ocsp_response);
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hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
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UpRef(prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
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hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
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ssl->verify_result = hs->new_session->verify_result;
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return ssl_verify_ok;
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}
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uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
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enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
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if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
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ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
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switch (ret) {
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case ssl_verify_ok:
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hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
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break;
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case ssl_verify_invalid:
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// If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
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if (hs->config->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
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ERR_clear_error();
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ret = ssl_verify_ok;
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}
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hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
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break;
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case ssl_verify_retry:
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break;
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}
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} else {
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ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
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hs->new_session.get(), hs, &alert)
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? ssl_verify_ok
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: ssl_verify_invalid;
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}
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if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
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}
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// Emulate OpenSSL's client OCSP callback. OpenSSL verifies certificates
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// before it receives the OCSP, so it needs a second callback for OCSP.
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if (ret == ssl_verify_ok && !ssl->server &&
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hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled &&
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ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) {
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int cb_ret =
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ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg);
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if (cb_ret <= 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
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cb_ret == 0 ? SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
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: SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
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}
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}
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ssl->verify_result = hs->new_session->verify_result;
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return ret;
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}
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// Verifies a stored certificate when resuming a session. A few things are
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// different from verify_peer_cert:
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// 1. We can't be renegotiating if we're resuming a session.
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// 2. The session is immutable, so we don't support verify_mode ==
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// SSL_VERIFY_NONE
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// 3. We don't call the OCSP callback.
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// 4. We only support custom verify callbacks.
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enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
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bool send_alert) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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assert(ssl->s3->established_session == nullptr);
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assert(hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
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uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
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enum ssl_verify_result_t ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
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if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
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ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
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}
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if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
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if (send_alert) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static uint16_t grease_index_to_value(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
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enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
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// This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16.
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uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index];
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ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
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ret |= ret << 8;
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return ret;
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}
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uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
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enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
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uint16_t ret = grease_index_to_value(hs, index);
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if (index == ssl_grease_extension2 &&
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ret == grease_index_to_value(hs, ssl_grease_extension1)) {
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// The two fake extensions must not have the same value. GREASE values are
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// of the form 0x1a1a, 0x2a2a, 0x3a3a, etc., so XOR to generate a different
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// one.
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ret ^= 0x1010;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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SSLMessage msg;
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if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
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return ssl_hs_read_message;
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}
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if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
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return ssl_hs_error;
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}
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// Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message.
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uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t finished_len;
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if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
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ssl_handshake_session(hs), !ssl->server) ||
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!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
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return ssl_hs_error;
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}
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int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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finished_ok = 1;
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#endif
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if (!finished_ok) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
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return ssl_hs_error;
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}
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// Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
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if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
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finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return ssl_hs_error;
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}
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if (ssl->server) {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
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ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
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ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
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}
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// The Finished message should be the end of a flight.
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if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
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return ssl_hs_error;
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}
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ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
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return ssl_hs_ok;
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}
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bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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const SSL_SESSION *session = ssl_handshake_session(hs);
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uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t finished_len;
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if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
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ssl->server)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
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if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
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MakeConstSpan(session->secret, session->secret_length))) {
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return false;
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}
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// Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
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if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
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finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return false;
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}
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if (ssl->server) {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
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ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
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ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
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}
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ScopedCBB cbb;
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CBB body;
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if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
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!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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ScopedCBB cbb;
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CBB body;
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if (!hs->ssl->method->init_message(hs->ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
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|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
|
|
!ssl_add_cert_chain(hs, &body) ||
|
|
!ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get())) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const SSL_SESSION *ssl_handshake_session(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
if (hs->new_session) {
|
|
return hs->new_session.get();
|
|
}
|
|
return hs->ssl->session.get();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
// Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on. Each condition may
|
|
// halt the handshake by returning, or continue executing if the handshake
|
|
// may immediately proceed. Cases which halt the handshake can clear
|
|
// |hs->wait| to re-enter the state machine on the next iteration, or leave
|
|
// it set to keep the condition sticky.
|
|
switch (hs->wait) {
|
|
case ssl_hs_error:
|
|
ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get());
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_flush: {
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_message:
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
|
|
if (ssl->quic_method) {
|
|
// QUIC has no ChangeCipherSpec messages.
|
|
assert(hs->wait != ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec);
|
|
// The caller should call |SSL_provide_quic_data|. Clear |hs->wait| so
|
|
// the handshake can check if there is sufficient data next iteration.
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
size_t consumed = 0;
|
|
ssl_open_record_t ret;
|
|
if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
|
|
ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
|
|
ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
|
|
ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == ssl_open_record_error &&
|
|
hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) {
|
|
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
|
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
|
|
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
|
|
// Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
|
|
// alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
|
|
// behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
|
|
// negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
|
|
// the original one.
|
|
//
|
|
// See https://crbug.com/446505.
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
bool retry;
|
|
int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
|
|
if (bio_ret <= 0) {
|
|
return bio_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (retry) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
|
|
// While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early.
|
|
*out_early_return = true;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_handoff:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_handback: {
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_handback;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The following cases are associated with callback APIs which expect to
|
|
// be called each time the state machine runs. Thus they set |hs->wait|
|
|
// to |ssl_hs_ok| so that, next time, we re-enter the state machine and
|
|
// call the callback again.
|
|
case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case ssl_hs_pending_session:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
|
|
assert(!hs->can_early_write);
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_early_return:
|
|
if (!ssl->server) {
|
|
// On ECH reject, the handshake should never complete.
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_rejected);
|
|
}
|
|
*out_early_return = true;
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_hints_ready:
|
|
ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case ssl_hs_ok:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Run the state machine again.
|
|
hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
|
|
if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
|
|
hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state());
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
|
|
if (!ssl->server) {
|
|
// On ECH reject, the handshake should never complete.
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_rejected);
|
|
}
|
|
// The handshake has completed.
|
|
*out_early_return = false;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the
|
|
// handshake.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
|