897 lines
26 KiB
C
897 lines
26 KiB
C
// Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project 2006.
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// Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../rsa/internal.h"
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#include "../../rsa_extra/internal.h"
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#define NO_PSS_SALT_LEN_RESTRICTION -1
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typedef struct {
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// Key gen parameters
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int nbits;
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BIGNUM *pub_exp;
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// RSA padding mode
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int pad_mode;
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// message digest
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const EVP_MD *md;
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// message digest for MGF1
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const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
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// PSS salt length
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int saltlen;
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// Minimum salt length or NO_PSS_SALT_LEN_RESTRICTION.
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int min_saltlen;
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// tbuf is a buffer which is either NULL, or is the size of the RSA modulus.
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// It's used to store the output of RSA operations.
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uint8_t *tbuf;
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// OAEP label
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uint8_t *oaep_label;
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size_t oaep_labellen;
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} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
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typedef struct {
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uint8_t *data;
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size_t len;
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} RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS;
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static int pkey_ctx_is_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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return ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
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}
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// This method checks if the NID of |s_md| is the same as the NID of |k_md| when
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// |pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)| is true and there is PSS restriction, which means
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// |min_saltlen| != |NO_PSS_SALT_LEN_RESTRICTION|.
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static int pss_hash_algorithm_match(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int min_saltlen,
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const EVP_MD *k_md, const EVP_MD *s_md) {
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if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) && min_saltlen != NO_PSS_SALT_LEN_RESTRICTION) {
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if (k_md != NULL && s_md != NULL) {
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return EVP_MD_type(k_md) == EVP_MD_type(s_md);
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} else {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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// Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary.
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static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
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return 1;
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}
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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return RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen, &(rsa->pss));
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}
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// Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
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// sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
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static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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RSA *rsa;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
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const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL;
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int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
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// Should never happen.
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if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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// If no restrictions just return.
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if (rsa->pss == NULL) {
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return 1;
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}
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// Get and check parameters.
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if (!RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_get(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen)) {
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return 0;
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}
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// See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible.
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// 8.1.1. Step1 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#section-8.1.1
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// 9.1.1. Step3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#section-9.1.1
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max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md) - 2;
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if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1) {
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max_saltlen--;
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}
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if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_SALT_LEN);
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return 0;
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}
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// Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
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// use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
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rctx->md = md;
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rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
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rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
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rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
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return 1;
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}
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// |pkey_pss_init| was assigned to both the sign and verify operations
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// of the |EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS| methods. This created an unwanted assembler
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// optimization for the gcc-8 FIPS static release build on Ubuntu x86_64.
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// The gcc-8 assembler will attempt to optimize function pointers used in
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// multiple places under a ".data.rel.ro.local" section, but "delocate.go"
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// does not have the ability to handle ".data" sections. Splitting
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// |pkey_pss_init| into two functions: |pkey_pss_init_sign| and
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// |pkey_pss_init_verify|, gets around this undesired behaviour.
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static int pkey_pss_init_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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return pkey_pss_init(ctx);
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}
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static int pkey_pss_init_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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return pkey_pss_init(ctx);
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
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rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
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if (!rctx) {
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return 0;
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}
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rctx->nbits = 2048;
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if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
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} else {
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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}
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rctx->saltlen = -2;
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rctx->min_saltlen = NO_PSS_SALT_LEN_RESTRICTION;
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ctx->data = rctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
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if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) {
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return 0;
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}
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sctx = src->data;
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dctx = dst->data;
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dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
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if (sctx->pub_exp) {
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dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
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if (!dctx->pub_exp) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
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dctx->md = sctx->md;
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dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
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dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
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if (sctx->oaep_label) {
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OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
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dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
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if (!dctx->oaep_label) {
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return 0;
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}
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dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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if (rctx == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx);
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}
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static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) {
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if (ctx->tbuf) {
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return 1;
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}
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ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
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if (!ctx->tbuf) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
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const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!sig) {
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*siglen = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*siglen < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->md) {
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unsigned out_len;
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switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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if (!RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &out_len, rsa)) {
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return 0;
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}
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*siglen = out_len;
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return 1;
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case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
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return RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen);
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return RSA_sign_raw(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig,
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size_t siglen, const uint8_t *tbs,
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size_t tbslen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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if (rctx->md) {
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switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa);
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case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
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return RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
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rctx->saltlen, sig, siglen);
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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size_t rslen;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
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rctx->pad_mode) ||
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rslen != tbslen ||
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CRYPTO_memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen) != 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *sig,
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size_t sig_len) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (out == NULL) {
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*out_len = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*out_len < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->md == NULL) {
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return RSA_verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, *out_len, sig, sig_len,
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rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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return 0;
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}
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// Assemble the encoded hash, using a placeholder hash value.
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static const uint8_t kDummyHash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
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const size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(rctx->md);
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uint8_t *asn1_prefix;
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size_t asn1_prefix_len;
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int asn1_prefix_allocated;
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&asn1_prefix, &asn1_prefix_len,
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&asn1_prefix_allocated, EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
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kDummyHash, hash_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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size_t rslen;
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int ok = 1;
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if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, sig_len,
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RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
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rslen != asn1_prefix_len ||
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// Compare all but the hash suffix.
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CRYPTO_memcmp(rctx->tbuf, asn1_prefix, asn1_prefix_len - hash_len) != 0) {
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ok = 0;
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}
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if (asn1_prefix_allocated) {
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OPENSSL_free(asn1_prefix);
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}
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if (!ok) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (out != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rctx->tbuf + rslen - hash_len, hash_len);
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}
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*out_len = hash_len;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!out) {
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*outlen = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*outlen < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
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rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md) ||
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!RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, rctx->tbuf, key_len,
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RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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return RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
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size_t *outlen, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t inlen) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
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const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
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if (!out) {
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*outlen = key_len;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*outlen < key_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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size_t padded_len;
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
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!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &padded_len, rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
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RSA_NO_PADDING) ||
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!RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
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out, outlen, key_len, rctx->tbuf, padded_len, rctx->oaep_label,
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rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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return RSA_decrypt(rsa, outlen, out, key_len, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) {
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if (!md) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int is_known_padding(int padding_mode) {
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switch (padding_mode) {
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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case RSA_NO_PADDING:
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case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
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case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
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if (!is_known_padding(p1) || !check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1) ||
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(p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
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0 == (ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) ||
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(p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING &&
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0 == (ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (p1 != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING && pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING || p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) &&
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rctx->md == NULL) {
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rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
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}
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rctx->pad_mode = p1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
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*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
|
|
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// |p1| can be |-2|, |-1| and non-negative.
|
|
// The functions of these values are mentioned in the API doc of
|
|
// |EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen| in |evp.h|.
|
|
// Accordingly, |-2| is the smallest value that |p1| can be.
|
|
if (p1 < -2) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
int min_saltlen = rctx->min_saltlen;
|
|
if (min_saltlen != NO_PSS_SALT_LEN_RESTRICTION) {
|
|
// Check |min_saltlen| when |p1| is -1.
|
|
if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST &&
|
|
(size_t)min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) ||
|
|
// Check |min_saltlen| when |p1| is the value gives the size of
|
|
// the salt in bytes.
|
|
(p1 >= 0 && p1 < min_saltlen)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->saltlen = p1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
|
|
if (p1 < 256) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->nbits = p1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
|
|
if (!p2) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#if defined(AWSLC_FIPS)
|
|
if (BN_get_word(p2) != RSA_F4) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
|
|
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) {
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rctx->md = p2;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
|
|
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
// Check if the hashAlgorithm is matched.
|
|
// Sec 3.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055#section-3.3
|
|
if (!pss_hash_algorithm_match(ctx, rctx->min_saltlen, rctx->md, p2)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_MD);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->md = p2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
|
|
rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
|
|
if (rctx->mgf1md) {
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Check if the hashAlgorithm is matched.
|
|
// Sec 3.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4055#section-3.3
|
|
if (!pss_hash_algorithm_match(ctx, rctx->min_saltlen, rctx->mgf1md, p2)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: {
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
|
|
RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS *params = p2;
|
|
rctx->oaep_label = params->data;
|
|
rctx->oaep_labellen = params->len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
CBS_init((CBS *)p2, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
BN_GENCB *pkey_ctx_cb = NULL;
|
|
|
|
// In FIPS mode, the public exponent is set within |RSA_generate_key_fips|
|
|
if (!is_fips_build() && !rctx->pub_exp) {
|
|
rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
|
|
if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
rsa = RSA_new();
|
|
if (!rsa) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
|
|
pkey_ctx_cb = BN_GENCB_new();
|
|
if (pkey_ctx_cb == NULL) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pkey_ctx_cb, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In FIPS build, |RSA_generate_key_fips| updates the service indicator so lock it here
|
|
FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
|
|
if ((!is_fips_build() &&
|
|
!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pkey_ctx_cb)) ||
|
|
(is_fips_build() &&
|
|
!RSA_generate_key_fips(rsa, rctx->nbits, pkey_ctx_cb)) ||
|
|
!rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
|
|
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
|
|
|
|
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
|
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, rsa);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
BN_GENCB_free(pkey_ctx_cb);
|
|
if (!ret && rsa) {
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
|
|
const char *value) {
|
|
if (value == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
|
|
// "sslv23" and "x931" are not supported
|
|
int pm;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
|
|
// OpenSSL also supports the typo.
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
|
} else {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
|
|
// "max" and "auto" are not supported
|
|
long saltlen;
|
|
|
|
// A value of "digest" or "-1" causes the salt to be the same length as the
|
|
// digest in the signature
|
|
if (!strcmp(value, "digest") || !strcmp(value, "-1")) {
|
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
|
|
} else {
|
|
char* str_end;
|
|
saltlen = strtol(value, &str_end, 10);
|
|
if(str_end == value || saltlen < 0 || saltlen > INT_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, (int)saltlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
|
|
char* str_end;
|
|
long nbits = strtol(value, &str_end, 10);
|
|
if (str_end == value || nbits <= 0 || nbits > INT_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, (int)nbits);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
|
|
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value)) {
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
BN_free(pubexp);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_BEGIN_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
|
OPENSSL_END_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// rsa_pss_keygen_XXX options are not supported
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_BEGIN_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
|
|
OPENSSL_END_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
|
|
}
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
|
|
size_t lablen = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
|
|
if (lab == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(lab);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_METHOD, EVP_PKEY_rsa_pkey_meth) {
|
|
out->pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
|
|
out->init = pkey_rsa_init;
|
|
out->copy = pkey_rsa_copy;
|
|
out->cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup;
|
|
out->keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen;
|
|
out->sign_init = NULL; /* sign_init */
|
|
out->sign = pkey_rsa_sign;
|
|
out->sign_message = NULL; /* sign_message */
|
|
out->verify_init = NULL; /* verify_init */
|
|
out->verify = pkey_rsa_verify;
|
|
out->verify_message = NULL; /* verify_message */
|
|
out->verify_recover = pkey_rsa_verify_recover; /* verify_recover */
|
|
out->encrypt = pkey_rsa_encrypt; /* encrypt */
|
|
out->decrypt = pkey_rsa_decrypt; /* decrypt */
|
|
out->derive = NULL;
|
|
out->paramgen = NULL;
|
|
out->ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl;
|
|
out->ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_METHOD, EVP_PKEY_rsa_pss_pkey_meth) {
|
|
out->pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
|
|
out->init = pkey_rsa_init;
|
|
out->copy = pkey_rsa_copy;
|
|
out->cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup;
|
|
out->keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen;
|
|
out->sign_init = pkey_pss_init_sign; /* sign_init */
|
|
out->sign = pkey_rsa_sign;
|
|
out->sign_message = NULL; /* sign_message */
|
|
out->verify_init = pkey_pss_init_verify; /* verify_init */
|
|
out->verify = pkey_rsa_verify;
|
|
out->verify_message = NULL; /* verify_message */
|
|
out->verify_recover = NULL; /* verify_recover */
|
|
out->encrypt = NULL; /* encrypt */
|
|
out->decrypt = NULL; /* decrypt */
|
|
out->derive = NULL;
|
|
out->paramgen = NULL;
|
|
out->ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl;
|
|
out->ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) {
|
|
/* If key type is not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
|
|
if ((ctx != NULL) && (ctx->pmeth != NULL)
|
|
&& (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
&& (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int padding) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, padding, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_padding) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, out_padding);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int salt_len) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int salt_len) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx,
|
|
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, salt_len, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_salt_len) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx,
|
|
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, out_salt_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *e) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, e);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
|
|
return EVP_RSA_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *label,
|
|
size_t label_len) {
|
|
RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS params = {label, label_len};
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, ¶ms);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const uint8_t **out_label) {
|
|
CBS label;
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, &label)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CBS_len(&label) > INT_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*out_label = CBS_data(&label);
|
|
return (int)CBS_len(&label);
|
|
}
|