1871 lines
51 KiB
C
1871 lines
51 KiB
C
// Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
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// CRL score values
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// No unhandled critical extensions
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#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
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// certificate is within CRL scope
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#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
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// CRL times valid
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#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
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// Issuer name matches certificate
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#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
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// If this score or above CRL is probably valid
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#define CRL_SCORE_VALID \
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(CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
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// CRL issuer is certificate issuer
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#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
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// CRL issuer is on certificate path
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#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
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// CRL issuer matches CRL AKID
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#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
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static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
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static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
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static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
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static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, X509_CRL *crl,
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X509 *x);
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static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x);
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static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
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int *pcrl_score);
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static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score);
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static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
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static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; }
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static int null_verify_custom_crit_oids_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
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X509 *x509,
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *oids) {
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// This returns 0 by default, so that the callback must be configured by the
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// user when enabling the custom critical extensions feature.
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return 0;
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}
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// cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
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// one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
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// returns zero.
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static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed) {
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if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int call_verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
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ok = ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx);
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// Historically, callbacks returning values like -1 would be treated as a mix
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// of success or failure. Insert that callers check correctly.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): Also use this wrapper to constrain which errors may be
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// suppressed, and ensure all |verify_cb| calls remember to fill in an error.
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BSSL_CHECK(ok == 0 || ok == 1);
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return ok;
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}
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// Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store
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static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
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X509 *xtmp = NULL;
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size_t i;
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// Lookup all certs with matching subject name
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certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
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if (certs == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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// Look for exact match
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
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xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) {
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break;
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}
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}
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if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) {
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X509_up_ref(xtmp);
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} else {
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xtmp = NULL;
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}
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sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
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return xtmp;
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}
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int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
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X509 *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
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int bad_chain = 0;
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
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int i, ok = 0;
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int j, retry, trust;
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STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
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if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
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return -1;
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}
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if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
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// This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
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// cannot do another one.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
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return -1;
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}
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if (ctx->param->flags &
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(X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT | X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) {
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// We do not support indirect or delta CRLs. The flags still exist for
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// compatibility with bindings libraries, but to ensure we do not
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// inadvertently skip a CRL check that the caller expects, fail closed.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
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return -1;
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}
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// first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
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// the first entry is in place
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ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
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if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
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goto end;
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}
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X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
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ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
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// We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
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if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
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goto end;
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}
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int num = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
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// |param->depth| does not include the leaf certificate or the trust anchor,
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// so the maximum size is 2 more.
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int max_chain = param->depth >= INT_MAX - 2 ? INT_MAX : param->depth + 2;
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for (;;) {
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if (num >= max_chain) {
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// FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if appropriate,
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// use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
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break;
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}
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int is_self_signed;
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if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
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goto end;
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}
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// If we are self signed, we break
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if (is_self_signed) {
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break;
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}
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// If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
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if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
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ok = get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
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if (ok < 0) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
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goto end;
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}
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// If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
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// again later.
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if (ok > 0) {
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X509_free(xtmp);
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break;
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}
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}
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// If we were passed a cert chain, use it first
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if (sktmp != NULL) {
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xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
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if (xtmp != NULL) {
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if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
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ok = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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X509_up_ref(xtmp);
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(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
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ctx->last_untrusted++;
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x = xtmp;
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num++;
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// reparse the full chain for the next one
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continue;
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}
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}
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break;
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}
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// Remember how many untrusted certs we have
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j = num;
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// at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
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// We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
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// complain.
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do {
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// Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
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i = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
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int is_self_signed;
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if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
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goto end;
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}
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if (is_self_signed) {
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// we have a self signed certificate
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if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
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// We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
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// find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
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// possible impersonation.
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ok = get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
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if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
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ctx->current_cert = x;
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ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
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if (ok == 1) {
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X509_free(xtmp);
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}
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bad_chain = 1;
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ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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} else {
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// We have a match: replace certificate with store
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// version so we get any trust settings.
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X509_free(x);
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x = xtmp;
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(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
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ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
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}
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} else {
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// extract and save self signed certificate for later use
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chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
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ctx->last_untrusted--;
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num--;
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j--;
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x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
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}
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}
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// We now lookup certs from the certificate store
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for (;;) {
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if (num >= max_chain) {
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// FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if
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// appropriate, use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
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break;
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}
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if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
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goto end;
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}
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// If we are self signed, we break
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if (is_self_signed) {
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break;
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}
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ok = get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
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if (ok < 0) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
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goto end;
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}
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if (ok == 0) {
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break;
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}
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x = xtmp;
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if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
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X509_free(xtmp);
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
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ok = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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// OpenSSL 1.1.1 continuously re-checks for trust and breaks the loop
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// as soon as trust has been established. 1.0.2 builds the chain with all
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// possible certs first and only checks for trust if the final cert in
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// the chain is self-signed.
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// This caused additional unanticipated certs to be in the established
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// certificate chain, particularly when |X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN| was
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// set. We try checking continuously for trust here for better 1.1.1
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// compatibility.
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trust = check_trust(ctx);
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if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
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break;
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}
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num++;
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}
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// we now have our chain, lets check it...
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trust = check_trust(ctx);
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// If explicitly rejected error
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if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
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ok = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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// If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
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// chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
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// checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
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// chain checking
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retry = 0;
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if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED &&
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!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) &&
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!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
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while (j-- > 1) {
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xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
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ok = get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
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if (ok < 0) {
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goto end;
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}
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// Check if we found an alternate chain
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if (ok > 0) {
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// Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
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X509_free(xtmp);
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// Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
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// alternate chain
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while (num > j) {
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xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
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X509_free(xtmp);
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num--;
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}
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ctx->last_untrusted = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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retry = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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} while (retry);
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// If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
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// self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
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// and set bad_chain == 1
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if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
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if (chain_ss == NULL ||
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!x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
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if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
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} else {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
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}
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ctx->current_cert = x;
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} else {
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if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss)) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
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ok = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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num++;
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ctx->last_untrusted = num;
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ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
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chain_ss = NULL;
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}
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ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
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bad_chain = 1;
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ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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}
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// We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose
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ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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ok = check_id(ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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|
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// Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
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// they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
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ok = check_revocation(ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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// At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it
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ok = internal_verify(ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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|
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// Check name constraints
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ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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goto end;
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}
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|
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// If we get this far evaluate policies
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if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) {
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ok = check_policy(ctx);
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}
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end:
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if (sktmp != NULL) {
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sk_X509_free(sktmp);
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}
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if (chain_ss != NULL) {
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X509_free(chain_ss);
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}
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|
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// Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error
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if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) {
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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}
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return ok;
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}
|
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|
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// Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
|
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//
|
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// |find_issuer| will directly return the pointer of the corresponding index
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// within |sk|. Callers of |find_issuer| should remember to bump the reference
|
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// count of the returned |X509| if the call is successful.
|
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static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) {
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size_t i;
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X509 *issuer, *candidate = NULL;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, x, issuer)) {
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candidate = issuer;
|
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if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, candidate, /*suppress_error*/ 1)) {
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break;
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}
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}
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}
|
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return candidate;
|
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}
|
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|
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// Given a possible certificate and issuer check them
|
|
|
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int x509_check_issued_with_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
|
|
X509 *issuer) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
|
|
if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
// If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = ret;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
|
|
return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
|
|
if (ctx->trusted_stack != NULL) {
|
|
// Ignore the store and use the configured stack instead.
|
|
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->trusted_stack, x);
|
|
if (*issuer) {
|
|
X509_up_ref(*issuer);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(issuer, ctx, x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_custom_critical_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
|
|
if (ctx->custom_crit_oids == NULL) {
|
|
// Fail if custom critical extensions are enabled, but none were set.
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
size_t known_oid_count = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ctx->custom_crit_oids);
|
|
if (known_oid_count == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Allocate |found_exts| to pass to the callback.
|
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *found_exts = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
|
|
if (found_exts == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Iterate through all critical extensions of |x| and validate against the
|
|
// ones that aren't recognized by |X509_supported_extension|.
|
|
int last_pos = X509_get_ext_by_critical(x, 1, -1);
|
|
while (last_pos >= 0) {
|
|
const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext(x, last_pos);
|
|
if (!X509_supported_extension(ext)) {
|
|
int found = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Iterate through all set |custom_crit_oids|.
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < known_oid_count; i++) {
|
|
const ASN1_OBJECT *known_ext =
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ctx->custom_crit_oids, i);
|
|
if (OBJ_cmp(ext->object, known_ext) == 0) {
|
|
// |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value| returns a direct pointer.
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *dup_obj = OBJ_dup(known_ext);
|
|
if (dup_obj == NULL || !sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(found_exts, dup_obj)) {
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT_free(dup_obj);
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(found_exts, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!found) {
|
|
// If any critical extension isn't in our known list, return early.
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(found_exts, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
last_pos = X509_get_ext_by_critical(x, 1, last_pos);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we get here, all unknown critical extensions in |x| were
|
|
// properly handled and we pass the ones that were found to the caller.
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_custom_crit_oids(ctx, x, found_exts)) {
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(found_exts, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(found_exts, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_curve_decoded_by_name(X509 *x) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
|
|
if (!pkey) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
|
|
if (ec_key == NULL) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_BEGIN_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
|
|
int is_explicit = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(ec_key);
|
|
OPENSSL_END_ALLOW_DEPRECATED
|
|
|
|
return !is_explicit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
|
|
// purpose
|
|
|
|
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
int ok = 0, plen = 0;
|
|
int purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
|
|
|
|
int num = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < num; i++) {
|
|
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
if ( // OpenSSL's historic check for unknown critical extensions.
|
|
// |EXFLAG_CRITICAL| indicates an unsupported critical extension was
|
|
// found in |x| during the initial parsing of the certificate.
|
|
(!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
|
|
(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) &&
|
|
// AWS-LC specific logic for enabling custom unknown critical
|
|
// extensions.
|
|
!check_custom_critical_extensions(ctx, x)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The |num > 1| condition intentionally skips this check for single-certificate chains
|
|
// (e.g., a self-signed leaf or a partial chain with only the target certificate). This
|
|
// maintains consistency with OpenSSL 1.1.1 behavior.
|
|
if (num > 1 && (ctx->param->awslc_flags&AWSLC_V_ENABLE_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS) == 0) {
|
|
// In OpenSSL 1.1.1 this check was done if |X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT| was enabled.
|
|
// We did not perform this check explicitly before, but the behavior was baked into
|
|
// SPKI with explicit parameters not being parsed for elliptic curve key types.
|
|
//
|
|
// A conforming public CA should not issue certificate with explicitly encoded parameters for
|
|
// EC keys, but for privately operated CA's this could be doing so still. To be backwards
|
|
// compatible with OpenSSL 1.1.1 we have added support for parsing SPKI with explicit parameters,
|
|
// so we have added a new option for enabling this during chain validation.
|
|
int ret = check_curve_decoded_by_name(x);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else if (ret == 0) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int must_be_ca = i > 0;
|
|
if (must_be_ca && !X509_check_ca(x)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0 &&
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca) != 1) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Check pathlen if not self issued
|
|
if (i > 1 && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) && x->ex_pathlen != -1 &&
|
|
plen - 1 > x->ex_pathlen) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Increment path length if not self issued
|
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
|
|
plen++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
end:
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int type_id) {
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (gs == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) {
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i);
|
|
if (g->type == type_id) {
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
int i, j, rv;
|
|
// Check name constraints for all certificates
|
|
for (i = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
// Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain
|
|
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
|
|
// including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
|
|
// but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
|
|
// to be obeyed.
|
|
for (j = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
|
|
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
|
|
if (nc) {
|
|
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
|
|
if (rv == X509_V_OK &&
|
|
(ctx->param->hostflags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) ==
|
|
0 &&
|
|
((ctx->param->hostflags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) !=
|
|
0 ||!has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS) )) {
|
|
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
|
|
}
|
|
switch (rv) {
|
|
case X509_V_OK:
|
|
continue;
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
|
|
ctx->error = rv;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
default:
|
|
ctx->error = rv;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) {
|
|
ctx->error = errcode;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = 0;
|
|
return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
|
|
char *name;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
|
|
name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
|
|
if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags, NULL) > 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return n == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
|
|
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
|
|
if (vpm->poison) {
|
|
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
|
|
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
int ok;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
// Check all trusted certificates in chain
|
|
for (size_t i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
|
|
// If explicitly trusted return trusted
|
|
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
|
|
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
|
|
}
|
|
// If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
|
|
// overridden.
|
|
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
|
|
ctx->error_depth = (int)i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
|
|
// return success.
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
|
|
X509 *mx;
|
|
if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) {
|
|
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
|
|
}
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
|
|
mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
|
|
if (mx) {
|
|
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
|
|
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
|
|
// standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
|
|
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
int last;
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) {
|
|
last = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
last = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
for (int i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
int ok = check_cert(ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
|
|
int ok = 0, cnum = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
|
|
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Try to retrieve relevant CRL
|
|
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
|
|
// If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->current_crl = crl;
|
|
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
X509_CRL_free(crl);
|
|
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX
|
|
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) {
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (notify) {
|
|
ctx->current_crl = crl;
|
|
}
|
|
int64_t ptime;
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
|
|
ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ptime = time(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
if (!notify) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0) {
|
|
if (!notify) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
|
|
i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
if (!notify) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
if (!notify) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (notify) {
|
|
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 **pissuer,
|
|
int *pscore, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) {
|
|
int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
|
|
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
|
|
X509_CRL *best_crl = NULL;
|
|
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
|
|
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
|
|
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, crl, x);
|
|
if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer
|
|
if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
|
|
int day, sec;
|
|
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
|
|
X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
|
|
// and |sec|.
|
|
if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
best_crl = crl;
|
|
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
best_score = crl_score;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (best_crl) {
|
|
if (*pcrl) {
|
|
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
|
|
}
|
|
*pcrl = best_crl;
|
|
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
|
|
*pscore = best_score;
|
|
X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
|
|
// 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
|
|
// the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
|
|
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, X509_CRL *crl,
|
|
X509 *x) {
|
|
int crl_score = 0;
|
|
|
|
// First see if we can reject CRL straight away
|
|
|
|
// Invalid IDP cannot be processed
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
// Reason codes and indirect CRLs are not supported.
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
// We do not support indirect CRLs, so the issuer names must match.
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check expiry
|
|
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) {
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer
|
|
if (!crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score)) {
|
|
// If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check cert for matching CRL distribution points
|
|
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score)) {
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return crl_score;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
|
|
int *pcrl_score) {
|
|
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
|
|
int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) {
|
|
cidx++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
|
|
|
|
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
|
|
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
|
|
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
|
|
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
|
|
// Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
|
|
// relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
|
|
// compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
|
|
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) {
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
|
|
size_t i, j;
|
|
if (!a || !b) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (a->type == 1) {
|
|
if (!a->dpname) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
// Case 1: two X509_NAME
|
|
if (b->type == 1) {
|
|
if (!b->dpname) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
|
|
nm = a->dpname;
|
|
gens = b->name.fullname;
|
|
} else if (b->type == 1) {
|
|
if (!b->dpname) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
// Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
|
|
gens = a->name.fullname;
|
|
nm = b->dpname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME
|
|
if (nm) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
|
|
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
|
|
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
|
|
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
|
|
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
|
|
if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check CRLDP and IDP. Return true when the CRL is a good
|
|
// candidate CRL from which to check revocation of the certificate.
|
|
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) {
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
|
|
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
|
|
// Skip distribution points with a reasons field or a CRL issuer:
|
|
//
|
|
// We do not support CRLs partitioned by reason code. RFC 5280 requires CAs
|
|
// include at least one DistributionPoint that covers all reasons.
|
|
//
|
|
// We also do not support indirect CRLs, and a CRL issuer can only match
|
|
// indirect CRLs (RFC 5280, section 6.3.3, step b.1).
|
|
if (dp->reasons != NULL || dp->CRLissuer != NULL) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// At this point we have already checked that the CRL issuer matches
|
|
// the certificate issuer (and set CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5280 Section 6.3.3 step b.2
|
|
if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)){
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the CRL does not specify an issuing distribution point, allow it to
|
|
// match anything.
|
|
// RFC5280 section 6.3.3 check (b).(2) does not prescribe what to do if the
|
|
// CRL does not include an IDP. This fallback returns true if the CRL did not
|
|
// include an IDP or an IDP without a DP. Such a CRL could still be a good
|
|
// candidate CRL to check against although we cannot check if it matches the
|
|
// DP in the certificate. In the event of multiple good candidate CRLs
|
|
// (crl_crldp_check() returns 1 and get_crl_score() scores them high), some
|
|
// without an IDP or with an IDP and without a DP and others matching the
|
|
// certificate's DP, get_crl_sk() will pick the freshest one.
|
|
return !crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
|
|
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) {
|
|
int ok;
|
|
X509 *issuer = NULL;
|
|
int crl_score = 0;
|
|
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
|
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, ctx->crls);
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Lookup CRLs from store
|
|
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
|
|
|
|
// If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that
|
|
if (!skcrl && crl) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, skcrl);
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
// If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success
|
|
if (crl) {
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
|
|
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
|
|
*pcrl = crl;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check CRL validity
|
|
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) {
|
|
X509 *issuer = NULL;
|
|
int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
int chnum = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
// if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that
|
|
if (ctx->current_issuer) {
|
|
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
|
|
// certificate in chain.
|
|
else if (cnum < chnum) {
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
|
|
// If not self signed, can't check signature
|
|
if (!x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (issuer) {
|
|
// Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present
|
|
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
|
|
!(issuer->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
|
|
if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to get issuer certificate public key
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
|
|
if (!ikey) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Verify CRL signature
|
|
if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check certificate against CRL
|
|
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) {
|
|
int ok;
|
|
X509_REVOKED *rev;
|
|
// The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
|
|
// critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
|
|
// was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
|
|
// change the meaning of CRL entries.
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
|
|
(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Look for serial number of certificate in CRL.
|
|
if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
X509 *current_cert = NULL;
|
|
int ret = X509_policy_check(ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies,
|
|
ctx->param->flags, ¤t_cert);
|
|
if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
|
|
ctx->current_cert = current_cert;
|
|
ctx->error = ret;
|
|
if (ret == X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509, int suppress_error) {
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int64_t ptime;
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
|
|
ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ptime = time(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notBefore(x509), ptime);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
if (suppress_error != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x509;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0) {
|
|
if (suppress_error != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x509;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notAfter(x509), ptime);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
if (suppress_error != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x509;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
if (suppress_error != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x509;
|
|
if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
X509 *xs, *xi;
|
|
|
|
int n = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
|
|
ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
|
|
n--;
|
|
xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
|
|
|
|
if (x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, xi, xi)) {
|
|
xs = xi;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
|
|
xs = xi;
|
|
goto check_cert;
|
|
}
|
|
if (n <= 0) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = xi;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else {
|
|
n--;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = n;
|
|
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ctx->error=0; not needed
|
|
while (n >= 0) {
|
|
ctx->error_depth = n;
|
|
|
|
// Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
|
|
// explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
|
|
// time.
|
|
if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi);
|
|
if (pkey == NULL) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = xi;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = xs;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_cert:
|
|
ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, /*suppress_error*/ 0);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The last error (if any) is still in the error value
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = xs;
|
|
ok = call_verify_cb(1, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n--;
|
|
if (n >= 0) {
|
|
xi = xs;
|
|
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the final certificate subject (leaf)
|
|
// has a public key we actually support. Otherwise
|
|
// we shouldn't consider the certificate okay. It is possible
|
|
// for it to be reject sooner during |check_chain_extensions| as well
|
|
// but disabling certain checks can result in an unuseable leaf certificate
|
|
// making it to this point.
|
|
//
|
|
// This covers situations like invalid curves or points.
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xs);
|
|
if(pkey == NULL) {
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = xs;
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
end:
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) {
|
|
return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, time(NULL));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, const time_t *cmp_time) {
|
|
int64_t compare_time = (cmp_time == NULL) ? time(NULL) : *cmp_time;
|
|
return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, compare_time);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_time_posix(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, int64_t cmp_time) {
|
|
int64_t ctm_time;
|
|
if (!ASN1_TIME_to_posix(ctm, &ctm_time)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
// The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
|
|
return (ctm_time - cmp_time <= 0) ? -1 : 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec) {
|
|
return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, const time_t *in_tm) {
|
|
return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec,
|
|
const time_t *in_tm) {
|
|
int64_t t = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (in_tm) {
|
|
t = *in_tm;
|
|
} else {
|
|
t = time(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
|
|
// This function is (usually) called only once, by
|
|
// SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
|
|
int index;
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
|
|
free_func)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; }
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) {
|
|
ctx->error = err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->error_depth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->current_cert;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (!ctx->chain) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->current_issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->current_crl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
// In OpenSSL, an |X509_STORE_CTX| sometimes has a parent context during CRL
|
|
// path validation for indirect CRLs. We require the CRL to be issued
|
|
// somewhere along the certificate path, so this is always NULL.
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; }
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
|
|
ctx->untrusted = sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->untrusted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) {
|
|
ctx->crls = sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
|
|
// If |purpose| is zero, this function historically silently did nothing.
|
|
if (purpose == 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
|
|
if (idx == -1) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx));
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, trust)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->param->purpose == 0) {
|
|
ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
|
|
// If |trust| is zero, this function historically silently did nothing.
|
|
if (trust == 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->param->trust == 0) {
|
|
ctx->param->trust = trust;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) {
|
|
return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
|
|
|
|
ctx->ctx = store;
|
|
ctx->cert = x509;
|
|
ctx->untrusted = chain;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
if (store == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
|
if (!ctx->param) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
|
|
!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (store->verify_cb) {
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (store->get_crl) {
|
|
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (store->check_crl) {
|
|
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (store->lookup_crls) {
|
|
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify_custom_crit_oids = null_verify_custom_crit_oids_callback;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
|
|
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
|
|
// avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
|
|
ctx->trusted_stack = sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(ctx->custom_crit_oids, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
|
|
int64_t t) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix(ctx->param, t);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
|
|
time_t t) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(ctx, flags, t);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->cert;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) {
|
|
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
|
|
if (!param) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
return ctx->param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
|
|
if (ctx->param) {
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->param = param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_add_custom_crit_oid(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ASN1_OBJECT *oid) {
|
|
GUARD_PTR(ctx);
|
|
GUARD_PTR(oid);
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *oid_dup = OBJ_dup(oid);
|
|
if (oid_dup == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->custom_crit_oids == NULL) {
|
|
ctx->custom_crit_oids = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
|
|
if (ctx->custom_crit_oids == NULL) {
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT_free(oid_dup);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(ctx->custom_crit_oids, oid_dup)) {
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT_free(oid_dup);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_crit_oids(
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_verify_crit_oids_cb verify_custom_crit_oids) {
|
|
ctx->verify_custom_crit_oids = verify_custom_crit_oids;
|
|
}
|