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cli/vendor/aws-lc-sys/aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digest.c

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// Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../evp/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
void EVP_MD_unstable_sha3_enable(bool enable) { // no-op
}
bool EVP_MD_unstable_sha3_is_enabled(void) { return true; }
int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->type; }
int EVP_MD_nid(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_type(md); }
uint32_t EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->flags; }
size_t EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->md_size; }
size_t EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->block_size; }
void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
}
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) {
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
if (ctx) {
// NO-OP: struct already zeroed
//EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
}
return ctx;
}
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void) { return EVP_MD_CTX_new(); }
int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
return 1;
}
OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data);
assert(ctx->pctx == NULL || ctx->pctx_ops != NULL);
// |pctx| should be freed by the user of |EVP_MD_CTX| if
// |EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX| is set. Everything other than the external |pctx| that |ctx->pctx| was pointing to is cleaned up when the flag is set.
if (ctx->pctx_ops && !(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX)) {
ctx->pctx_ops->free(ctx->pctx);
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
return 1;
}
void EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_data == NULL || ctx->digest == NULL) {
return;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
}
void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
if (!ctx) {
return;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); }
// EVP_DigestFinalXOF is a single-call XOF output generation function.
// The |ctx->digest| check prevents calling EVP_DigestFinalXOF consecutively.
// To catch single-call XOF EVP_DigestFinalXOF calls after |EVP_DigestSqueeze|,
// the return |SHAKE_Final| value is used (the check is internally performed via
// the |KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx| state flag).
int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
if (ctx->digest == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if ((EVP_MD_flags(ctx->digest) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
int ok = ctx->digest->finalXOF(ctx, out, len);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(ctx);
return ok;
}
// EVP_DigestSqueeze is a streaming XOF output squeeze function
// It can be called multiple times to generate an output of length
// |len| bytes.
int EVP_DigestSqueeze(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
if (ctx->digest == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if ((EVP_MD_flags(ctx->digest) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
ctx->digest->squeezeXOF(ctx, out, len);
return 1;
}
uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); }
void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
// |in->digest| may be NULL if this is a signing |EVP_MD_CTX| for, e.g.,
// Ed25519 which does not hash with |EVP_MD_CTX|.
if (in == NULL || (in->pctx == NULL && in->digest == NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, DIGEST_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
assert(in->pctx == NULL || in->pctx_ops != NULL);
if (in->pctx) {
pctx = in->pctx_ops->dup(in->pctx);
if (!pctx) {
return 0;
}
}
uint8_t *tmp_buf = NULL;
if (in->digest != NULL) {
if (out->digest != in->digest) {
assert(in->digest->ctx_size != 0);
tmp_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(in->digest->ctx_size);
if (tmp_buf == NULL) {
if (pctx) {
in->pctx_ops->free(pctx);
}
return 0;
}
} else {
// |md_data| will be the correct size in this case. It's removed from
// |out| so that |EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup| doesn't free it, and then it's
// reused.
tmp_buf = out->md_data;
out->md_data = NULL;
}
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
out->digest = in->digest;
out->md_data = tmp_buf;
if (in->digest != NULL && in->md_data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(out->md_data, in->md_data, in->digest->ctx_size);
}
out->update = in->update;
out->flags = in->flags;
// copied |EVP_MD_CTX| should free its newly allocated |EVP_PKEY_CTX|.
out->flags &= ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX;
out->pctx = pctx;
out->pctx_ops = in->pctx_ops;
assert(out->pctx == NULL || out->pctx_ops != NULL);
return 1;
}
void EVP_MD_CTX_move(EVP_MD_CTX *out, EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
// While not guaranteed, |EVP_MD_CTX| is currently safe to move with |memcpy|.
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
EVP_MD_CTX_init(in);
}
int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
EVP_MD_CTX_init(out);
return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in);
}
int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
return 1;
}
int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *engine) {
if (ctx->digest != type) {
ctx->digest = type;
if (!used_for_hmac(ctx)) {
assert(type->ctx_size != 0);
ctx->update = type->update;
uint8_t *md_data = OPENSSL_malloc(type->ctx_size);
if (md_data == NULL) {
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data);
ctx->md_data = md_data;
}
}
assert(ctx->pctx == NULL || ctx->pctx_ops != NULL);
if (used_for_hmac(ctx)) {
// These configurations are specific to |EVP_PKEY_HMAC|. |HMAC_PKEY_CTX| is
// newly allocated by |EVP_DigestSignInit| at this point. The actual key
// data is stored in |ctx->pkey| as |HMAC_KEY|.
if (ctx->pctx == NULL || ctx->pctx->data == NULL ||
ctx->pctx->pkey == NULL || ctx->pctx->pkey->pkey.ptr == NULL) {
return 0;
}
const HMAC_KEY *key = ctx->pctx->pkey->pkey.ptr;
HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hmac_pctx = ctx->pctx->data;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_pctx->ctx, key->key, key->key_len, hmac_pctx->md,
ctx->pctx->engine)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
ctx->digest->init(ctx);
return 1;
}
int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type) {
EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
}
int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t len) {
if (ctx->update == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return ctx->update(ctx, data, len);
}
int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out, unsigned int *size) {
if (ctx->digest == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (EVP_MD_flags(ctx->digest) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
ctx->digest->final(ctx, md_out);
if (size != NULL) {
*size = ctx->digest->md_size;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
return 1;
}
int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md, unsigned int *size) {
int ok = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
return ok;
}
int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count, uint8_t *out_md,
unsigned int *out_size, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) {
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
int ret;
if ((EVP_MD_flags(type) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) && out_size == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, type, impl) &&
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, count);
if (ret == 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_MD_flags(type) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) {
ret &= EVP_DigestFinalXOF(&ctx, out_md, *out_size);
} else {
ret &= EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, out_md, out_size);
}
return ret;
}
const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return ctx->digest;
}
size_t EVP_MD_CTX_size(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
return EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx));
}
size_t EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
return EVP_MD_block_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx));
}
int EVP_MD_CTX_type(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
return EVP_MD_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx));
}
int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *digest) { return 1; }